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ARTICLES
THE EMPEROR'S CLOTHES ARE NOT
EFFICIENT: POSNER'S
JURISPRUDENCE OF CLASS*
MARK

M.

HAGER**

"The past isn't dead. It isn't even past." William Faulkner
INTRODUCTION

People wonder how Judge Richard Posner writes so much.
Though only at mid-career, Posner has produced more than a dozen
books and well over a hundred articles. Part of the answer, apparently, is that Posner works incessantly and has few outside interests.
The other part of the answer is that Posner's stuff is not that good.
To be sure, Posner's work is ambitious in scope and aspiration.
At its best, it is also impressively critical, balanced, and multi-perspectival. Too often, however, Posner's thought is glib and shallow.
His presentations cascade trippingly from issue to issue, seldom
pausing to develop the complexities of any topic, or even the ramifications of his own best insights. Lapses in argument and deficiencies in knowledge show themselves throughout. These flaws,
moreover, are not distributed randomly. On the contrary, they form
a jurisprudence of zealous attack on challenges to private economic
power.
These features manifest themselves in Posner's most recent book,
provided there is not still another by the time this essay is published:
The Problems ofJurisprudence.1 In the space of less than five hundred
© 1991 Mark M. Hager.
Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. B.A.
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pages, the book takes the reader on a whistle-stop tour of JurisprudeLand, from the ancient Greeks up through contemporary feminism and critical legal studies, with pit stops for "practical
reason," 2 "distributive justice," 3 and "scientific observation," '4 and
side trips to view "ontological skepticism" 5 and "interpretive theory." 6 The opening section, "A Short History of Jurisprudence,"
exemplifies the way Posner likes to work, swooping from Antigone
7
through Ronald Dworkin in only fifteen pages.
Posner does provide some nice critical discussion along the way.
He is sharp-eyed, for example, in unravelling Richard Epstein's desperately-stitched quiltwork of Aristotelean corrective justice, libertarian property rights, utilitarianism, and socio-biology.8 Posner also
highlights serious deficiencies in feminist "different voice" jurisprudence, 9 though his implication that the "different voice" school exhausts the world of feminist jurisprudence is misleading. Posner
also more cursorily points out difficulties in the more extravagant
romantic communitarian strains of civic republicanism and critical
legal studies, though again seems to mistake certain parts for the
wholes. 10 Much of Posner's commentary is neither well-reasoned
nor penetrating, although it is sometimes interesting and occasionally insightful. My own jurisprudential interests do not run strongly
to many of the topics he takes up and I suspect that Posner's don't
either. Posner's current intent appears to be to establish himself as
a broadly learned, conservative centrist jurisprude, appropriate perhaps for a Republican nomination to the Supreme Court. Perhaps
because his reputation as an ideologue of the right could stand in
the way of ascension to the Court, Posner goes to considerable
lengths to disclaim identification as an ideologue of any sort. I '
2. See id. at 71-78 (analyzing how non-credulous observers form beliefs about law which
cannot be verified by logic).
3. See id.
at 334-38 (examining best means to agreed ends of Aristotle, Bruce Ackerman,
Jirgen Habermas, Michael Walzer, and Richard Epstein).
4. See id. at 61-70 (reviewing use of scientific observation as method of inquiry).
5. See id. at 161-67 (outlining approaches to questions of existence).
6. See id.at 247-309 (comparing interpretive theories of common law, statutory law, and
constitutional law).
7. Id at 9-23.
8. See id. at 323-26 (outlining and critiquing Epstein's argument in favor of expanding
strict liability in tort law and citing Epstein, Nuisance Law: CorrectiveJustice and Its Utilitarian
Constraints,8J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 50 (1979) and Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System
of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974)); id at 342-48 (discussing Epstein's attempts to
root law in combination of nature and utility and citing, e.g., Epstein, Possession at the Root of
Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979)).
9. See id.at 404-13 (questioning coherence of feminist views on law as such, as distinct
from heightened sensivtivity to women's issues).
10. See id. at 414-19 (highlighting difficulty of holding clear middle ground between liberal humanism and utopian communitarianism).
11. See id at 32. Posner states:
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Progressives would do well to think twice about a Bork-style campaign against Posner were he ever chosen. Although Posner's paper
12
trail, with articles like "The Economics of The Baby Shortage,"
might make him a temptingly easy target, there are probably judges
who would be much worse than Posner on many issues progressives
hold dear. I see no reason to predict Posner would swing far to the
right on many issues more often than would typical conservative
centrist jurists. In fact, Posner's temperamental and intellectual
contrariness might even take the form of some sharp progressive
departures from conservative centrism.
There should be no mistake, however, about Posner's continuing
allegiance to law and economics jurisprudence. Posner has labored
long to extend economic metaphor into a wide range of issue areas,
and though he disclaims any rigid viewpoint, he can be expected to
maintain his efforts along these lines. Despite their apparent rigor,
these excursions often lead to innocuous decision outcomes. In
particular areas, however, Posner's law and economics sustains consistently regressive views and results. These are areas in which the
nature and shape of economic institutions are most directly implicated: questions about the proper direction and control of economic power.
Little doubt exists that Posner will continue to stand for protecting and expanding the prerogatives of privately-owned productive
wealth. The results of this viewpoint are devastating to social progress. In fact, I believe that the ideologies of private wealth are
more damaging than any other feature of our social landscape because they place crippling limits on our capacities to remedy racism,
sexism, health and education deficiencies, contempt for human
rights, and environmental wastrelism. Yet the ideologies of private
wealth are by far the most powerful and least questioned aspects of
our ideological world. Because the sufferance for class-stratified
private ownership is so total, little may be gained from keeping its
zealous ideological champions, such as Judge Posner, off the Court.
The incremental damage of his zealotry in this area should be
weighed against the damage to various progressive interests which
might be inflicted more heavily by other potential nominees than by
Posner.
My position may seem boringly centrist, but it will provoke both the true centrists in
the profession, who want very much to believe that law is autonomous and apolitical,
and the political activists who want to move the law sharply to the left or to the right.
Id
12. See Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 339
(1978) (arguing that "baby selling" should be regulated less stringently than it is at present).
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With these considerations firmly in mind, I present here a critique
of Posner's economic jurisprudence, in the course of commentary
on The Problems of Jurisprudence and Posner's other work.' 3 It is

worthwhile to explore Posnerian thought carefully, so as to undermine the plausibility of its ideologies, resurgent with the demise of
party-state socialism.
I.

JURISPRUDENCE WITHoUT FOUNDATIONS

As heirs to legal realism, adherents of the left-oriented critical
legal studies school, the "crits," have long maintained that there is
no distinct or correct legal way of analyzing and settling social issues.' 4 All legal disputes are social, moral, and political, driven by
clashes of values and of interests.1 5 No legal-or for that matter,
philosophical-methodology can remove such disputes to a separate plane and resolve them neutrally, without attending to and
choosing among the values and interests at stake. The crits argue
that we should focus intently on these clashing values and interests
and ask ourselves directly how they should be weighted. Like the
legal realists before them, the crits devote considerable energy to
the critique of thought systems such as original intent, natural law,
and neutral principles, which purport to wield some distinctive
"legal" analysis that sidesteps the true value choices involved. 16
In The Problems ofJurisprudence, Posner pitches his tent squarely in
the crit camp. Posner debunks viewpoints which deny the element
of active value-choice in legal decisionmaking. He emphatically rejects critiques of "judicial activism"' 17 and rebukes both "original
meaning" constitutionalism 8 and "formalism," which he usefully
13. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) [hereinafter W. LANDES & R. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; Posner, Some Economics of Labor
Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 988 (1984) [hereinafter Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law]; R. PosNER, THE ECONOMICS OFJUsTICE (1981) [hereinafter R. POSNERJUSTICE]; Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973) [hereinafter Posner, Strict Liability); Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) [hereinafter Posner, A Theory of Negligence].
14. See Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding
Drama of Critical Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 208-13 (1984) (examining reasoning by
which critical legal scholars find discrete, doctrinal components, such as tort and constitutional law to be indeterminate and manipulable).
15. Id; see also R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 153 (maintaining that critical
legal studies finds legal solutions indistinguishable from ethical or political ones).
16. See Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 567-602 (1983)
(describing critical legal studies' critique of objectivism, formalism, and constructs that replace them).
17. See R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 138-40 (setting forth his conception
of optimal role ofjudges in implementing government policy).
18. See id. at 140-41 (stating that general principles in Constitution are "a compass, not a
blueprint").
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defines as the conception of law as a "system of relations among
ideas rather than as a social practice."' 9 Posner implicitly and explicitly disparages the notions that there can be "autonomy of legal
reasoning as a methodology of decision-making" and "objectivity"-meaning agreement as to correctness among people with differing values and interests-in legal outcomes. 20 A blind-folded crit
hearing Posner's conclusion that "legal reasoning is not special"
and "often does not yield determinate outcomes" 21 could scarcely
be blamed for thinking she was hearing one of her own.
Posner of course senses that he's flirting with some strange
bedfellows, left-leaning legal realism and critical legal studies
among them, but although having pitched his tent in their camp, he
declines to curl up with them. Posner even amalgamates his viewpoint to legal realism, but emphasizes that his view is "shorn... of
the left-of-center politics characteristic of that movement and its offspring."'2 2 At no point, however, does Posner detail what he takes
this "left-of-center politics" to embody or how or why he repudiates
it. He seems to assume that rejecting something because it23is "leftof-center" requires no further explanation or justification.
Although it is clear that Posner rejects left-of-center values, he
does little to tell us which or why. We may assume that Posner sees
left-of-center politics as frustrating to the realization of his own values. What those values are and how Posner thinks law must be arranged to achieve them, are explored below. Pausing to dwell,
however, on Posner's brief but direct attacks on critical legal studies
is revealing. In The Problems ofJurisprudnce Posner asserts that:
Critical legal studies has not yet penetrated a single area of law,
partly because of the confrontational, eOater les bourgeois style of
many of its practitioners, partly because its politics are extremely
left-wing, but mainly because of its all-encompassing negativism
about the possibility of either coherent doctrine or constructive
proposals for
reform. This negativism acts as a damper on useful
24
doctrines.
legal
reconceptualizing
or
changing
Posner's point, apparently, is to explain why critical legal studies
viewpoints are not significantly embodied in law. A common-sense
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 454.
Id. at 454, 459-60.

Id. at 107.
Id at xii.
Posner goes on to take some further swipes, trotting out the by-now-familiar and

perfectly preposterous suggestion that crits are moral "nihilists." R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE,

supra note 1, at 459. He also implies that because the crits are "left-wing," they must also be
"hostile to legal doctrine" as such, and also hostile to "logic." IM.at 441.
24. Id. at 441.
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explanation is that few legal decisionmakers have read, or care to
read, crit literature. Furthermore, the legal order as a whole is ideologically hostile to crit values. Posner, however, ignores these obvious explanations and offers three of his own, giving himself a
somewhat gratuitous opportunity for crit-bashing: the crits' confrontational style; left-wing politics; and "negativism" about "coher25
ent doctrine" and "constructive reform."
These three points are essentially one. While I have my own stylistic differences with some of the crits, I fail to see how they could
be other than "confrontational" when faced with a legal order they
see as systematically hostile to their deeply-held values. Posner disparages these values with the label "left-wing" without either explaining what the values are or offering reasons for rejecting them.
He goes on to complain of "negativism," but again fails to acknowledge that the legal order's rejection of crit values and viewpoints
might be precisely what causes crits to view that legal order negatively. Posner's corollary charge, that crits refuse to deal with "doctrine" or "constructive reform" 2 6 is simply untrue. One of the
signal characteristics of crit literature is its painstaking attempt to
create cogently-reformulated legal doctrines to embody crit values. 27 Of course, as long as the legal order repudiates these ideas,
they are easily disparaged as not being "constructive," which justifies the refusal to take them seriously.
Posner dutifully acknowledges crit claims of the interweaving of
law and politics, as he must, given the fact that he vigorously defends that very point. Nevertheless, he rebukes the crits on precisely this issue, asserting that he has "tried to show" that the crits
'
exaggerate the political element in law, "large as that element is.
"2
This is curious, however, because, while there are two places in the
book where Posner attempts to show that crits exaggerate law's
25. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 441.
26. Id.
27. To illustrate the point, I cite a sampling of crit articles in the single field of labor law.
See generally Raskin, Book Review, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1067 (1991) (reviewing P. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990)); Hyde, A Theory of Labor Legislation, 38 BUFFALO L. REV. 383 (1990); Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and
Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1749 (1990); Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected ProtestActivities Under the NationalLabor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789 (1989); Beermann and Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property inJobs, 23 GA. L.
REV. 911 (1989); Klare, Workplace Democracy and Market Reconstruction: An Agendafor Legal Re.
form, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1988); Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 614
(1988); Pope, Labor-Community Coalitionsand Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and
the Living Constitution, 69 Tzx. L. REV. 889 (1991).
28. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 441.
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political element, his overall argument is driven by the view that law
and politics cannot be separated.
One passage where Posner purportedly refutes the crits is a response to an article by James Boyle, "The Anatomy of a Torts
Class."' 29 Boyle's article illustrates the non-objective, indetermi30
nate, and therefore implicitly political character of legal decisions.
Posner seems to believe that by refuting Boyle on particular points,
he will have debunked the thoroughgoing crit, law-is-politics position. Posner's characterizations and refutations of Boyle are obtuse
in numerous respects, only two of which I will highlight.
Posner takes Boyle to task, first, for his illustrative discussion of
Vosburg v. Putney, the classic tort case wherein one boy kicks another
who, as a result of a preexisting injury at the spot of the kick, sustains an unforeseeably severe injury. 3 ' Boyle emphasizes the indeterminate and therefore implicitly political nature of Vosburg's status
as precedent.3 2 Depending on how the "rule" in Vosburg is articulated, the case carries strikingly different consequences, or lack of
consequences, for future cases. As Boyle indicates, a broad interpretation of Vosburg would hold all people liable for all unforeseeable consequences of their acts.33 This implies the elimination of
tort immunity for children, lunatics, the blind, and other less capable individuals, and might vindicate a universal principle of strict
liability. A narrow reading of Vosburg, on the other hand, suggests
that if one child hits another after class has been called to order, a
presumption may be strengthened that the act was intentional and
that any injury is therefore compensable with damages.3 4 Boyle's
point is that the question whether and how to apply Vosburg in subsequent cases involves implicitly political choices, as to both the values
embodied in the case itself and those that press for recognition in
subsequent cases. 3 5 The "meaning" of Vosburg, therefore, emerges
only through processes of political choice and will vary with future
Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 1003 (1985); see R. POSNER,
supra note 1, at 255-59.
30. Boyle, supra note 29, at 1019-22 (describing political underpinning of legal
argument).
31. 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891); see R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 255
(discussing case).
32. See Boyle, supra note 29, at 1018-19 (finding purely legal analysis of decision in Vosburg inadequate).
33. See id. at 1054 (describing generation of both broad and narrow rules from same case
as technique to serve any side of argument).
34. Id.
35. See id at 1019 (contrasting outcome in Vosburg with failure to find liability in Harley v.
Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901), where defendant physician refused to treat
dying patient).
29.

JURISPRUDENCE,
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changes. This is true even where decisionmakers do not experience
their choices as "political."
Stuff and nonsense, says Posner. Boyle overlooks the fact that a
definitive "thin skull" rule "has actually emerged from Vosburg" and
"has been confirmed in hundreds of cases." 3 6 The law is not indeterminate and inherently political, argues Posner. After all, judges
use Vosburg as a legal rule every day. Boyle's point, however, is not
that legal rules do not emerge or constrain judges' decisions. On
the contrary, his point is that the accepted interpretations of a case
emerge through a political process which involves ongoing choice,
and are not determined in the future by the purely "legal" informa37
tion extant at the outset of the process.
Posner's second criticism of Boyle is as obtuse as the first. Here,
Posner challenges Boyle's discussion of the perennial rule/standard
conundrum: whether to treat comparable cases similarly, so as to
promote certainty and equality, or to distinguish them and accord
different treatments, so as to effectuate particularized justice.3 8
Boyle uses this conundrum to illustrate the ubiquity of indeterminacy and political choice in the law.3 9 Posner rebukes Boyle for ignoring the scholarly literature that identifies the trade-offs between
rules and standards. According to Posner, making these trade-offs
involves "a process of reasoning and not, as Boyle appears to believe, a merely whimsical or ideological choice." 40 Nowhere does
Boyle deny, however, that rule/standard choices entail a species of
reasoning, or that such reasoning is informed by legal materials.
Boyle's point, rather, is that legal materials do not provide determinative answers or methodology, but instead supply political considerations that are weighed in a political, but simultaneous "legal"
process. 4 1 Nowhere does Boyle suggest that these processes are in
the least bit "whimsical."
Posner's other refute-the-crits passage4 2 is comparable in quality
to the first, but is somewhat more revealing of the value dichotomy
36. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 255-56.
37. See Boyle, supra note 29, at 1034-46 (observing that classical legal doctrines are objectified social theory). Boyle notes that each period in legal thought has rested its authority
on some notion of neutrality; however, preferences for particular rules may have consequences which are decidedly not neutral, having disparate impacts, for example, based on
race, gender, or income. Development of such preferences is a political process which cannot
help but influence accepted interpretations of legal theory. Id
38. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, Supra note 1, at 256.
39. See Boyle, supra note 29, at 1007-09 (describing contradictory views of law-one, that
law is settled body of rules; the other, that law is "manipulable, grab bag of arguments").
40. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 256.
41. See Boyle, supra note 29, at 1023-24 (suggesting impact on individuals of public and
private laws depends on political choices with distributive consequences).
42. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 153-57.
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he discerns between the crits and himself. Posner here characterizes
the crit position as the view that "all law is politics in a narrow and
disreputable sense and right-wing politics at that." 43 This statement
is merely a caricature of actual crit positions. Posner is closer to the
mark when he writes that crits view the legal order as "permeated by
'44
class bias" so as to be "subtly tilted in favor of the upper class."
Maybe this view of law is accurate, maybe it isn't, Posner indicates;
but in any case, the crits fail to explain normatively why legal tilt in
favor of the upper classes is "more disreputable" than tilt in favor of
the downtrodden. 45 Posner is correct that crits by and large do not
explain why legal tilt favoring the "haves" is bad. One might have
thought this does not need much elucidation, but Posner implies a
different view of the matter-bias toward the upper class may be
good. 4 6 He hints elsewhere that there is nothing wrong with laws
shaped by the interest of "dominant groups in society" because
such laws may proiect the interests of those who do not belong to
the dominant classes. 47 This may be true sometimes, but Posner
completely ignores the contrary possibility that laws shaped in the
interests of dominant classes often frustrate the interests of those
who do not belong. Posner seems untroubled by this latter possibility and is therefore doubly susceptible to legal and economic arguments favoring the interests of private productive wealth.
Because legal reasoning can attain neither autonomy nor objectivity, Posner holds that legal practitioners and decisionmakers must
embrace a "jurisprudence without foundations." 48 This theory acknowledges the absence of any normative authority beyond the
value and interest clashes constituting actual social and legal disputes. Posner does little, however, to define or describe "jurisprudence without
foundations." To Posner, his "jurisprudence" is
"pragmatist" 4 9 or "pragmatic," 50 deploying "practical reason,"
which he explains as a "grab bag of informal methods of reason52
ing"5 1 and "an unstable class of disparate reasoning methods."
Posner defines practical reason as "setting a goal.., and choosing
43.

Id. at 153.

44.

R. POSNER, JURISPRIUDENCE, supra note 1, at 153.

45. Id
46. See id. (wondering why justice that favors upper class is thought to be worse than
justice that favors lower class).
47. See idt at 127 (examining legitimacy of adjudication); see also id. at 319 (positing that
dominant public opinion may promote justice).
48.

Id at 421.

49.
50.

Id. at 454.
Id. at 423.

51.
52.

Id. at 455.
Idt at 86.
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the means best suited to reaching it." 53 These formulas, however,

do little more than convey the rhetorical impression that Posner
stands for a jurisprudence that is scrupulously non-ideological.
Posner also reiterates paeans to economic analyses of law, which
he clearly means to characterize as non-ideological. Posner explains
the value-"wealth maximization"-he feels law and the economic
analysis of law properly promotes. This value and its concomitant
analytical methods and conclusions play a major role in his "nonideological" practical reason. 54 If, however, wealth maximization is
the goal which practical reason, by means/ends rationality, should
strive to realize, there is ample reason for alarm over Posner's "jurisprudence without foundations."
II.

WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND WEALTH MAXIMIZATION

Although he accedes to the notion that legal reasoning lacks autonomy and objectivity, Posner characterizes economics as a science. 55 This implies that economic reasoning can, at least
potentially, attain autonomy and objectivity. In several passages,
Posner hints that economic analysis provides legal decisionmakers
an escape from the world of value clash and controversy into a realm
56
of clear answers and value-neutral conclusions.
One representative passage emanates from Posner's contention,
which he has made before, that the common law is best understood
as an ongoing quest for wealth maximization. The dominant common law doctrines, Posner believes, are those most conducive to
wealth maximization. 57 To understand this, he argues, is to grasp
how the common law can embody both autonomy and objectivity,
virtues attainable under no alternative approach:
Besides generating both predictions and prescriptions, the economic approach enables the common law to be reconceived in
simple, coherent terms and to be applied more objectively than
traditional lawyers would think possible. From the premise that
the common law does and should seek to maximize society's
wealth, the economic analyst can deduce in logical-if you will,
53. Id at 71.
54. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1,at 423.
55. See id at 63 (noting that while law cannot be considered scientific and will not be for
some time, economics, including economic analysis of law, is science).
56. See, e.g., id. at 106-07 (commenting on economic reasoning's inroads into law); id. at
360-62 (characterizing economic analysis as empirically verifiable); id at 372 (stating economic analysis provides judges with "comfortable" and "socially useful" guide for deciding
cases).
57. See id at 360 (arguing that common law tends to become more efficient since efficient
decisions involve lesser social costs than inefficient ones).

1991]

POSNER'S JURISPRUDENCE OF CLASS

formalist-fashion (economic theory is formulated nowadays
largely in mathematical terms) the set of legal doctrines that will
express and perfect the inner nature of the common law, and can
compare these doctrines with the actual doctrines of common law.
After translating from the economic vocabulary back into the legal
one, the analyst will find that most of the actual doctrines are tolerable approximations to the implications of economic theory and
are formalistically valid. Where there are discrepancies, the path
to reform is clear-yet the judge who takes the path cannot be
accused of making rather than finding law, for he is merely contributing to the program of realizing the essential nature of the
58
common law.
Posner's claims for law and economics contrast with his attacks on
all legal aspirations toward autonomy and objectivity. Although
logically inconsistent, Posner's presentation is rhetorically seductive. It may appeal mightily to those of power and sophistication,
who manifest skepticism and embarrassment in the presence of
"moral" arguments but engage themselves comfortably with the
hard-headed "economic" aspect of issues. People of this stripe,
who are often quick in their ascents toward power, typically find
Posnerian approaches and conclusions most convincing. On the
other hand, people of the opposite sensibility often find themselves
frozen in the face of Posner-style economic arguments. Progressive
scholars and activists typically suffer from an almost math-anxiety
aversion to economics, yielding an insidious syndrome of selfdoubt-the feeling that though progressive values are worthy and
good, the real world of economic analysis tells us that such worthy
values are not attainable. The progressives may have all the right
values, but the conservatives have all the sound economic arguments. This syndrome is reinforced by the recent developments in
Eastern Europe, which have been widely interpreted as reflecting
the failure of socialism and the success of capitalism. 59 It is therefore crucial for progressives to look in detail at the economic arguments of someone like Posner, so as to comprehend their
monumental hollowness.
A good example of Posner's economic analysis is a passage where
58. Id. at 361.
59. See, e.g., L.A. Times, July 26, 1991, at 1, col. 5 (detailing President Mikhail
Gorbachev's urging of Soviet Communist Party to abandon "ossified dogmas" of Marxist ideology and recognize failure of Soviet socialism); Wash. Times, July 1, 1991, at G4, col. 1
(quoting All-Union Center for Public Opinion survey of Soviet Union revealing minimal support for socialism and inverse relationship between support for socialism and level of education); Fukuyama, The End of History?, THE NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 3 (arguing
Western liberal democracy is final form of humane government and end-point of mankind's
ideological evolution).

18
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he defends his contention that the common law has long been dominated by a norm of efficiency. Posner argues that cases decided mistakenly from the standpoint of efficiency tend to generate more
pressure forjudicial or legislative reversal than do decisions decided
"correctly" by efficiency standards. Hence, over time, efficiencyproducing doctrines will prevail over alternatives. 60 One might ask,
however, how it is that "inefficient" doctrines generate greater pressure for reversal than "efficient" ones. According to Posner, the
losers in cases adopting "inefficient" rules lose more than do the
losers in cases applying "efficient" rules. Application of "inefficient" rules, therefore, results in greater pressure for and
probability of reversal. 6 1
Posner's model realistically posits that strong, organized pressure
on behalf of interests plays a key role in legal evolution. Posner's
conclusion is unconvincing, however, because it fails to consider
how disparities in wealth distribution affect the evolutionary process. When legal rules are determined, losers with less money are
less likely to challenge them successfully than losers with more
money, regardless of whether the challenged rule is "efficient" or
"inefficient." The law's evolution will thus tend to favor wealthier
interests over less wealthy, efficiency notwithstanding. Without first
establishing a high degree of economic equality, therefore, it is impossible to sustain any strong assertion as to the law's proclivity toward efficiency. Despite this, economic equality is a legal goal which
Posner emphatically repudiates. 6 2
Posner supplements his first argument with another. Cases litigated under inefficient rules, he argues, typically involve larger
stakes than those litigated under efficient rules and are therefore
more likely to be litigated fully rather than settled. This offers more
chance for judicial reversal.6 3 This argument is dubious, however,
in at least two respects. First, Posner fails to explain why litigants in
high-stakes cases are less likely to settle. In fact, precisely because
the stakes are so high, the parties in such cases might be more likely
to settle, rather than gamble all-or-nothing. More fundamentally,
Posner fails to explain convincingly why he thinks that litigation
under inefficient doctrines tends to involve higher stakes than litigation under efficient doctrines.
Posner does indicate that inefficient rules, by definition, generate
60. R.

POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 360.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 382 (stating each individual has no moral entitlement to share of world's
wealth proportional to his or her contribution to it).
63. Id. at 360.
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social waste.6 I fail to see, however, why rules which generate social waste must also create higher-stakes disputes. Rather, the size
of disputes seems to depend more on distributions of given sums of
economic advantage and disadvantage among few or many potential
litigants. For example, if the advantage of a particular inefficient
doctrine is distributed on one side among a few entities, while the
disadvantage is distributed on the other side among many, potential
challengers would on average have less at stake than potential defenders of the existing doctrine. Under such conditions, the inefficient rule may be self-perpetuating. Perhaps Posner assumes an
even spread of advantages and disadvantages, so that the average
losers have more incentive to challenge inefficient rules than to challenge efficient ones. This assumption, however, merely converts
Posner's second argument back into his first, with the obvious defect, highlighted above, of ignoring wealth distributions.
Ignoring wealth distribution issues is in fact the hallmark of Posner's economic jurisprudence. This is not to say that he never addresses himself to such issues. He exhibits, however, a curious and
telling inability to sustain any confrontation with them. This inability has a twofold manifestation: first, Posner cannot seem to take
wealth distribution seriously as a moral issue; and second, he repeatedly omits consideration of distributional factors relevant to his efficiency analyses and conclusions.
The first deficiency is well highlighted in a section of The Problems
ofJurisprudence entitled "Distributive Justice."6 5 One might expect
that a section so titled would articulate and defend some conception
of fair distributions in social wealth. Instead, Posner offers critiques
of two legal philosophies of distributive justice: Bruce Ackerman's
egalitarianism and Richard Epstein's anti-redistributionist libertarianism. Posner's criticisms, however, distance him from the entire
problem.
Posner finds fault, on several grounds, with Epstein's position that
the redistributive use of governmental regulatory, taxing, and
spending authority violates the natural rights of those whose wealth
is diminished. Posner first points out the practical difficulty of distinguishing illegitimate redistributive government action from legitimate non-redistributive action.6 6 In addition to this practical
objection, Posner further questions whether Epstein's anti-redistributionist stance is right in principle. Posner suggests that there
64.

Id.

65.

R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 334-48.

66.

Id. at 344.
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may be valid and sound reasons for redistributive government.
First, he says, if we "[s]uppose that because of malice or envy poor
people find rich people deeply offensive," we could conclude that
the rich, because of the mere fact of their riches, are "hurting" the
poor. If so, wealth redistribution might be justified as a means of
"correcting negative externalities." 6 7 Posner also argues that
wealth redistribution may be warranted to head off revolution or violence by the "have-nots." Because "envy and restlessness" among
the poor are "brute facts," according to Posner, redistribution of
wealth may be needed precisely in order to protect unequal
68
wealth.
Posner may view his critique of Epstein's fanatic anti-redistributionism as an index of his own pragmatism, centrism, and non-radicalism. Posner's "defense" of redistributive government, however,
has a surreal and disturbing cast. He does not even mention, much
less evaluate, any suggestion that redistribution may be morally desirable or mandatory because there are people in our midst with intolerable living conditions. It seems almost unimaginable that
Posner could address the simple notion that the riches of some
might be causally linked to the poverty of others, a circumstance
which might raise discomfitting questions.
An inquiry which declines even to raise such issues cannot be considered a serious commentary on distributive justice. The disturbing character of Posner's discussion goes beyond this, however.
69
His defenses of redistribution focus on "envy" among the poor. It
is tendentious to characterize resentments among the poor as envy
rather than as the products of victimization by injustice. His focus
on envy, moreover, identifies the problem as a defective state of
mind among the poor, rather than as the social order which perpetuates poverty and yields such a state of mind. Posner seems to
defend redistribution, yet readers who accept his premises will easily conclude that envy is a moral flaw among the poor for which a
response of redistribution is not warranted. Though Posner hints
that his position may make him a defender of the "modem welfare
state,"' 70 the welfare state is better off without his kind of friendship.
Posner's critique of Ackerman's argument that justice demands
67. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 344.
68. Id
69. Id
70. See id (defending redistribution as means for wealthy to protect their personal property against violence or trespass by poor).
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essentially egalitarian income patterns 7 1 also illustrates his discomfort with the moral dimensions of wealth distribution. Posner labels
Ackerman's preference for equal distribution "arbitrary," as if this
label alone rebuts the moral claim of egalitarianism. 7 2 Posner simply cannot confront the actual nature of Ackerman's egalitarianism
as a moral value. To do so would require some answer to the moral
claim posed; Posner's dismissal of the claim as arbitrary facilitates
evasion. Posner quarrels with Ackerman's notion that wealth is a
form of social power which warrants equal distribution for the same
reasons the power to vote is equally distributed. 73 He offers no reason, however, why wealth should not be analyzed as a species of social power. Posner quickly terminates his discussion of distributive
justice, apparently concluding that justice or injustice is not attributable to any pattern of wealth distribution. "Distributive justice
seems quite hopeless . . . " Posner writes.7 4 He also indicates that
he has no objection in principle to forcible wealth redistribution.7 5
Posner's failure to address the fundamental issues of distributive
justice suggests that it is he, not the crits, who could rightly be
76
reproached as a moral nihilist.
There is more, however, to Posner's position on wealth distribution than this apparent agnosticism. In The Problems ofJurisprudence,
as in previous works, Posner emphasizes the difference between
wealth maximization, which seeks to maximize "wealth," and utilitarianism, which seeks to maximize utility or happiness. 7 7 In a utilitarian world, a legal decisionmaker is supposed to seek to maximize
the net additive sum of happiness over unhappiness. 7 8 The desire
for happiness of each person affected is legitimately counted in the
decision. This egalitarian treatment of all affected persons contributes to whatever moral plausibility utilitarianism may have. The
norm of wealth maximization, however, does not carry this egalita71.

Id. at 336-37 (examining B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE

(1980)).
72.

Id. at 337.

73. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 337 (disputing Ackerman's contention
that individuals must make equal sacrifice of their rights).
74. Id at 460.
75. See id at 381 (stating that "[i]f redistribution is desirable, some involuntary redistribution may be justifiable, depending on the costs, of course, but not on the principle of the
thing").
76. See id. at 459 (criticizing legal nihilism as no more tenable than moral realism or legal

formalism).
77. See id. at 391 (arguing that what most judges believe to be utilitarianism is probably
wealth-maximization); R. POSNER, JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 48-81 (developing concept ofjustice based on wealth maximization, not utility maximization).
78. See R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 346 (discussing Epstein's marriage of
utilitarianism and libertarianism).
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rian thrust. Posner defines the wealth which is to be maximized as,
roughly, willingness and ability to pay. Hence when legal decisionmakers proceed under a norm of wealth maximization, they
should weigh the interests of the affected parties only insofar as
79
those parties are willing and able to pay for the goods at stake.
Many legal disputes can be described as contests over which party
has the superior claim of "entitlement" as to the values or goods at
stake. Wealth should be maximized in resolving such disputes, Posner argues, by assigning each entitlement to whatever party is most
willing and able to pay for it. The straightforward implication of
this argument is that under wealth maximization the interests of the
wealthy count for more than the interests of the poor in legal decisionmaking. Posner is in no way abashed about acknowledging this
point. A person who wants or needs a good very badly but is "unwilling or unable" to pay for it, "perhaps because he is destitute,"
simply does not count in a jurisprudence of wealth maximization.8 0
As Posner vividly puts it, "[a]nother implication of the wealth-maximization approach, however, is that people who lack sufficient earning power to support even a minimum decent standard of living are
entitled to no say in the allocation of resources unless they are part
of the utility function of someone who has wealth." 8'
Utilitarianism, like Posner's jurisprudence, often works from the
notion that goods should go to those who value them most. The
passage quoted above reveals, however, the crucial difference between Posner's and the utilitarian's view of what it means to say that
someone "values" a good. This difference is between value as "utility"-how much good something will do for someone-and value as
"wealth"-how much someone is willing/able to pay for something.
The law should seek to maximize wealth, Posner argues, not utility.
Posner uses this distinction between utility and wealth to attack
the classic utilitarian argument in favor of wealth redistribution
from wealthy to poor. The utilitarian argument assumes that the
marginal utility one draws from a given sum of wealth diminishes
the more wealth one has.8 2 Restating this argument in homespun
terms, one hundred dollars means far more to a pauper than to a
millionaire. There is a net gain in utility, therefore, if the hundred
79. See id. at 357 (distinguishing wealth maximization from utilitarianism).
80. R. POSNER, JUSrICE, supra note 13, at 61 (defining "value" in terms of willingness to
pay, not happiness derived); see R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 357 (noting that
desire or need without ability to pay has no standing).
81. R. POSNER, JUsTICE, supra note 13, at 76.
82. See W. JERONS, THE THEORY OF POLrrICAL EcONOMY 39-49 (1911) (echoingJeremy
Bentham's calculus of pleasure and pain in developing theory of consumption of wealth).
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dollars, and many hundreds more, are taken from the millionaire
and given to the (former) pauper. Posner rejects this utilitarian argument for wealth transfers because, although such transfers may
augment utility, they do not augment wealth.83 His norm of wealth
maximization, therefore, requires that he oppose them.
Posner's conception of wealth maximization may favor an upward

rather than downward redistribution of wealth. According to Posner, legal decisions should seek to maximize wealth, defined as willingness and ability to pay. It follows, therefore, that decisions and
the rules established by them should favor the parties most willing
and able to pay for the goods at stake. The surreal twist is that the
parties most willing or able to pay for the goods at stake get them by
virtue of Posner's method without actually having to pay for them.
There is no one to whom payment can be made, since the issue is
who should have the goods in question to start with.
The internal incoherence of such a decisionmaking method is explored further below. Meanwhile, however, we do well to focus on
the dynamic consequences of Posner's approach. Parties favored by
legal decisions gain wealth by virtue of those decisions as compared
with disfavored parties. Hence, those favored by past decisions will
also be favored in future ones, precisely because they have more
wealth and thus a higher willingness/ability to pay. The wealth
maximization norm, therefore, creates an order in which legal rules
and wealth are continually distributed more and more in favor of the
wealthy. This process could conceivably continue until one person
owned everything, the law having given it to him because he was
most able to pay for it, even though he did not actually have to pay
for things because the law gave them to him. Justice maximized!
Posner is himself intrigued by this scenario. He acknowledges that
ownership of all goods by one person would not violate the norm of
wealth maximization.8 4 In this light Posner modestly admits that
85
wealth maximization looks like a "truncated concept of justice."
No kidding. The problem, however, is that Posner refuses to acknowledge the force of any principle of distributive justice which
might check the skewed wealth patterns likely to emerge from his
jurisprudential methodology.
How does Posner not deem it monstrous to disparage the interests of parties unable to pay? His answer is that the law is right to
83. See R. POSNER,JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 391 (proposing that under utilitarianism, thief ought to be able to defend himself on ground that he derived greater pleasure from
stolen item than pain suffered by owner).

84. Id. at 375.
85.

Id
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favor people in accordance with their productivity. The wealthy are
more productive and have therefore conferred more benefit on society than the poor, hence meriting society's reward. The poor are
poor because they are not productive.8 6
This line of thought ignores a multitude of considerations. First,
it ignores the moral problems which arise when one asks why the
wealthy are more productive than the poor-perhaps because the
wealthy have more wealth. Second, it presumes that the wealthy are
the more productive because they would not be Wealthier were they
not more productive. While there may be correlations between increased productivity and increased wealth, there are strong reasons
to doubt that wealth ownership is a good general index of productivity. Too many extra-legal non-productivity factors such as racism,
sexism, luck, inheritance, education, integrity, generosity, greed,
and unscrupulousness can affect wealth levels. Although Posner acknowledges some of these problems, this does not seem to dampen
his enthusiasm for the wealth maximization approach. 7
Less obvious, though nonetheless critical, are the ways in which
legal rules themselves favor the accumulation of wealth in some
hands and not in others. A party's wealth reflects not only its productivity but also the degree to which the legal regime has favored
its interests. It is, in fact, a core tenet of Marxist economics that
legal regimes allow some parties to accumulate wealth in disproportion to their own productivity by capturing the productivity of
others.88 Posner's method of basing legal rules explicitly on ability
to pay provides an excellent opportunity for this to occur. While
Posner might contend that the problem vanishes if legal favoritism
is calibrated to real productivity, this does not resolve the problem if
productivity is naively equated with wealth.
The wealth favoritism of Posner's jurisprudence is intrinsic, not
incidental. It manifests itself throughout Posner's conception of the
legal/political process. Posner treats the notion that legislation
yields any true "public interest" with skepticism.8 9 On the contrary,
he maintains, legislation typically represents wealth transfers to or86. See R. POSNER, JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 81 (stating that in system of wealth maximization, distributional considerations are resolved without need for any just distribution of
wealth).
87. See R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 391-92 (conceding wealth maximization is not "pure ethic of productivity").
88. See F. ENGELS, THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND 317-24 (B.
Blackwell 2d ed. 1971) (Ist ed. 1845) (examining legal framework of capitalist oppression).
89. See R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 354 (assuming legislators maximize
their own satisfaction like everyone else).
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ganized interest groups at the expense of the unorganized. 90 Posner betrays no misgivings over this situation, insisting that, among
the various branches of government, distributive decisions are properly left for the legislature. 9 1 He also offers no criticisms or suggestions for reform of an order in which the strong and well-organized
can secure wealth transfers in their favor.
In Posner's world, the weak, poor, and unorganized-victims of
the legislative cat fight-also find no solace in the courts. Posner
sees the judge's role as essentially two-fold-the resolution of disputes in accord with the norm of wealth maximization, and the interpretation and enforcement of legislative decisions. 92 These roles
overlap, of course, insofar as legislative enactments govern routine
legal disputes. Hence, in Posner's view, courts merely implement
legislative distributional mandates within the norms of wealth maximization. 93 Posner's vision takes the minimalized "night watchman" state of classical capitalist libertarianism, as its utopian
vision. 94 No hyperbole or satire could outdo Posner in manifesting
the ideological proclivities progressives always fear from such a
utopia.

III.

DECISIONS, RULES, ENTITLEMENTS

Posner's argument that judges should resolve disputes so as to
maximize wealth 95 contains multiple overlapping and interwoven incoherences. One trail into the swamp is to recall that Posner identifies wealth maximization with outcomes articulated by nineteenthcentury common law doctrine, which he in turn equates with a laissez-faire market economy. 96 Posner's wealth maximization jurisprudence is therefore a dream of the unregulated market and an
implicit reproach to latter-day departures from free-market common
law wisdom.
Posner's anachronistic vision is remarkable for its utter failure to
97
absorb the implosion of the very idea of an unregulated market.
90. Id at 354-55.
91.
92.

Id at 388.
R. POSNER, JURIsPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 388. (finding judicial wealth maximiza-

tion and legislative distribution of entitlements to be sensible division of labor).
93. Id at 387-88.
94. IA at 387.
95. See id at 356-57 (arguing that wealth in wealth maximization is measured by price
people are willing to pay for goods if they have ability to pay that price).
96. See id at 359 (arguing judges decide common law cases according to dictates of
wealth maximization).
97.

See Vandall,Judge Posner'sNegligence-Efficieny Theory: A Critique, 35 EMORY LJ. 83, 99

(1986) (maintaining that Posner's efficiency theory fails because it rests on incorrect assumptions about markets).
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Legal realists and crits, among others, have emphasized that all markets require property and contract rules to define respective rights
over wealth and the conditions for their legitimate transfer. There
are therefore no natural or unregulated markets, because every existing market is an artifact of the legal regulations that constitute it.
Discourse which distinguishes regulation from unregulated markets
is therefore nonsense, strictly speaking. Markets differ in the forms
and structures of their definitive regulatory constitutions, but the
unregulated market with its assumed efficiency advantages cannot
be found, because the idea itself is internally self-contradictory."8
This point is by now so well-established in mainstream legal literature that Posner's failure to consider it is nothing short of
astonishing.
The collapse of the "unregulated market" idea deals a deathblow
to Posner's jurisprudence. Posner acknowledges, as he must, that
property and contract rules may be drawn and redrawn in countless
different ways, such that no "natural" or preferred configuration of
rights can plausibly be identified. 99 This further undermines the authority of common law jurisprudence, with its implicit and often explicit orientations toward "natural" legal structures.
The problem of articulating a proper scheme of economic rights
and rules, or entitlements, is thoroughly insoluble within Posner's
framework. There are perhaps four paradigms available for approaching the problem: (1) natural rights; (2) distributive justice;
(3) legislative enactments; and (4) wealth maximization. Posner's
bearings grow hopelessly confused as he tries to navigate through
these possibilities.
Posner's own legal sophistication, and his sense of what contemporary minds will entertain as plausible, compels him to forsake the
natural rights approach as understood by nineteenth-century common law jurists.' 0 0 Posner falls back on natural law notions only
implicitly and covertly, at moments when his argument would
founder without them. 10 1 As to distributive justice, Posner's attitude is deeply equivocal. There are moments in The Problems ofJurisprudence, as in Posner's other works, where he seems to acknowledge
that the problems of entitlement definition are problems of distribu98. See Unger, supra note 16, at 625 (insisting that contract law essentially defines
market).
99.

See R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 38 (conceding that many important

legal questions have indeterminate answers).
100. See id at 457 (stating that judges "make rather than find law," and that only ethical
and policy preferences ofjudges themselves are what remains of "natural law").
101. See id at 197-201 (attacking critical legal studies belief that moral issues have correct
answers).
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tive justice.10 2 Unfortunately, as highlighted above, Posner recoils
from the implications of distributive justice inquiry and strongly
suggests that such inquiry is superfluous and lacking in both validity
10 3
and value.
Posner engenders this contradiction, positing a scheme of distributive justice and simultaneously repudiating it, because he fears
overly-searching judicial inquiry into configurations of entitlements. 10 4 On the one hand, judges should apply and enforce entitlements established by non-judicial bodies according to
considerations of distributive justice.10 5 Thus, the judicial role includes "corrective justice"-the protection from invasion of rights
defined in some scheme of distributive justice-but does not embrace attention to the large social considerations pertinent in articulating the distributive scheme itself.'0 6 Despite this admonition,
however, judges may be uncomfortable with defending or believing
in certain schemes of "distributive justice" elucidated elsewhere.
Even more disturbingly, judges may recognize that their decisions
carry distributional consequences, so that society's actual scheme of
distributive justice is what emerges from those very decisions.
Either or both of these factors might drive judges toward their own
inquiries into distributive justice. Don't bother, Posner seems to tell
them at this point, the inquiry is bottomless and you can only come
up empty-handed.
The legislature, of course, is one arena for the delineation of entitlements that the judiciary can follow.' 0 7 Indeed, Posner indicates
that the fundamental role of articulating entitlements should be displaced from the judiciary to the legislature.10 8 This displacement,
however, is problematic in several respects. First, an active legislative role seems to contradict Posner's belief in the wisdom of nineteenth-century common law. If the classic common law was getting
it right in delineating entitlements, better to diminish the legislative
102. See idLat 324 (arguing that sphere of distributivejustice determines what entitlements
person has); see also R. POSNER, JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 65 (discussing relationship between
property rights and distributive justice).
103. R. POSNER,JUSnCE, supra note 13, at 81.
104. See R. POSNER,JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 313-52 (discussing difference between
corrective and distributive justice and rejecting idea that judges should look for political norm
to determine legal obligations).
105. See id at 388 (articulating judicial and legislative division of labor in which judiciary
maximizes input of entitlements created by legislature).
106. Id; see id at 316-17 (describing notion of "corrective justice").
107. See id at 360 (pointing out that legislatures have ability through taxing and spending
powers to redistribute wealth).
108. See id (insisting that legislature should determine wealth distribution and judiciary
should apply efficient rules).

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:7

role rather than exalt it. Second, the legislature turns out not to be
a forum where distributive justice concerns can actually get heard.
Posner portrays, with no evident disapproval or regret, a process
in which strong and well-organized interests secure legislation
transferring wealth in their favor from the weak and ill-organized.10 9
Though this might seem to undermine the moral authority of legislatively defined entitlements as bequeathed to the judiciary, Posner
nevertheless insists that the judiciary should defer to legislatively
defined entitlements and stay out of the business of inquiring on its
own as to proper entitlements." 0 The judiciary's limited proper
role is thus two-fold: first, the application and enforcement of legislative enactments; and second, the promotion of wealth maximization. Still more confusion arises here, however, because Posner has
advised us that the legislative distributive process of wealth-raiding
is unlikely to coincide with, and may easily contradict, considerations of wealth maximization."' If so, the judiciary's mandate to
promote wealth maximization clashes with the imperative that it defer to legislatures. Posner betrays no inkling of this problem, nor
does he tell us why entitlements articulated by the legislative process, as he portrays them, should carry any moral weight in the first
place.
Though Posner confusingly alludes to both distributive justice
and legislative enactment as foundations of entitlement definition,
part of him seeks to rely on wealth maximization alone as the device
for delineating entitlements. Posner retreats toward distributive
justice when the complexities of wealth maximization inquiry seem
intractable or its implications unsavory. Unwilling to tarry long with
distributive justice, however, Posner excuses himself awkwardly and
shuffles off toward the legislature. After finishing up there (and perhaps stopping off for a stiff drink or two), he seems to have forgotten what was troubling him and, in a much cheerier mood, returns
with gusto to wealth maximization.
While it is tempting to dwell further on the obtuse assumptions
and repugnant implications of wealth maximization, it is worthwhile
to inquire instead into the internal intellectual coherence of Posner's model. Because space permits only a few illustrative criticisms, I focus on several specific problems out of a much wider host
109. See id. at 354-55 (describing how organized interest groups pressure legislatures to
pass statutes which transfer wealth to them from unorganized taxpayers).
110. See R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 355 (advocating that judges should be
agents of legislatures).
111. See id at 354 (noting that legislators are generally motivated to maximize self interest, not necessarily wealth).
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of weak positions and arguments. Moreover, I try to articulate arguments not extensively rehearsed in the critical literature on law and
economics, though some well-established arguments are too crucial
to omit.
Several problems flow from Posner's benchmark position that
judges should rule always to maximize wealth, but never to redistribute wealth. This view is based on Posner's notion that judicial
rulings cannot effectively redistribute wealth, because attempts to
do so generate incentives which induce market actors to alter practices in ways that undo or cancel out the intended redistributive effects.1 1 2 Posner's favorite and oft-repeated example of this is that
pro-tenant legal changes in residential rental properties inevitably
lead to rent hikes and/or diminished market availability.'1 3 This
scenario is vastly oversimplistic and hence exaggerated in its cer4
tainty as to such dire outcomes, as has been argued elsewhere."
Moreover, there is disharmony between the notion that the judiciary
cannot efficaciously redistribute and certain other Posnerian
propositions.
First, an anomaly exists in Posner's myth of the common law's
evolution toward efficiency and wealth maximization.' 15 In order
for legal rules to have evolved toward efficiency, they must have
been less efficient at an earlier period. A move toward greater efficiency requires changes in the legal rules which enrich some interests and impoverish others, with the gains presumably exceeding
the losses. These gains and losses, of course, represent redistributions. Redistribution, however, is what Posner insists cannot be accomplished by common law rule changes, because it will always be
undone by inevitable secondary effects.1 6 Were this truly the case,
the common law could never have evolved toward greater efficiency.
Posner might respond that rule changes could redistribute wealth
efficiently in the past, but can do so no longer. This argument, how.
ever, requires the assertion that we are now at the precise moment
in history when all attempted redistributions are cancelled by a
backflow of secondary effects. This seems improbable and certainly
112. Id. at 359.
113. Id. Posner believes that rules allowing tenants to break leases induce landlords to
raise rents, which poor tenants cannot pay. Id
114. See Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing on Behalf of the Poor, 80 YALE LJ. 1093, 110410, 1115-16 (1971) (arguing that comprehensive and strictly enforced housing code programs
will not have deleterious effect on housing costs and conditions).
115. See R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note I, at 356 (arguing that judges created law
which maximizes society's wealth).
116. See id. at 359 (discussing judges' inability to redistribute wealth because gains from
common law rule changes are always offset by losing parties' attempts to return to status quo).
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unprovable. Posner's defense of the "pre-regulatory" common law
status quo seems to imply that the classical common law scheme had
somehow arrived at optimal equilibrium, so that no departures
could augment, and many might diminish, wealth.1 17 Because there
can be no empirical proof of this notion, its plausibility must rest
entirely on the idea that common law rules somehow came to embody the "natural" imperatives of the competitive market. This,
however, cannot stand against the realist/crit insight that no preregulated market-unstructured by particular legal rules-can be
imagined as an independent variable or causal agent that accounts
for legal evolution.
There are other perplexities as well. Posner portrays a legislative
process of wealth-raiding with redistributive consequences. 118 He
also clearly imagines that legislative actions can effectively accomplish redistribution. 1 9 He never explains, however, how these legislative redistributions evade the backflow effects which supposedly
confound judicial efforts at redistribution.
Deeper problems emerge upon scrutiny of the wealth-maximization methodology itself. The reductio ad absurdum of one-personowns-everything, discussed above, highlights a more general incoherence in Posner's reliance on the following two axiomatic propositions: first, all voluntary exchanges enhance wealth because
each item of trade winds up in the hands of a buyer willing and able
to pay more to acquire it than the seller is willing to forego in order
to retain it; and second, that the initial entitlement to an item should
ideally lie with the person who values it most, in terms of willingness
and ability to pay. Taken together, these two propositions weave a
paradox, in that every wealth-enhancing exchange reveals an inefficient error in the pre-exchange assignment of entitlements. By revealing who valued each item more, the exchange indicates who
should have had the entitlement to that item in the first place. This
paradox emphasizes an "uncertainty principle" in the heart of Posner's economic science. This "uncertainty principle" is that law
cannot promote "efficiency" through the simultaneous devices of
fostering free exchange on the one hand and delineating base-line
entitlements based on willingness and ability to pay on the other. At
117.

See id. at 356 (praising common law as "remarkable"

example of wealth

maximization).
118. See R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 354-55 (discussing how wealth of un-

organized citizens is redistributed to organized interest groups).
119. See id. at 360 (comparing judges' lack of capacity to redistribute wealth effectively
with legislatures' ability to accomplish it).
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any given moment the law can follow one or the other of these
objectives, but it cannot follow both at once.
This paradox illuminates an absurdity in the neoclassical tautology embodied in Posner's first proposition on wealth-maximizing
voluntary exchanges. This neoclassical market model stresses that
wealth is created in the sphere of circulation, not production. 120 According to this conception of wealth and efficiency, "wealth" expands each time a good is bought and sold in trade. By this
reasoning, the more transactions required for each good to reach its
ultimate destination in the hands of the person who "values" it
most, the greater the "wealth" and "efficiency" of an economic system. Such a system then should be "wealthier" than one which by
some "planning" device assigns goods directly to those who will
value them most. The absurdity of the exchange vision of "efficiency" is underscored by recognizing that in the real world, each
reiterated transaction entails actual economic costs, which can be
counted as pure waste. In an ironic sense, Posner's method of assigning entitlements, to the highest "valuer," is the socialist planner's fantasy since each good is assigned precisely and directly to
whomever will "value" it most. What separates Posner from socialism, however, are divergent conceptions of "value." Socialism
equates "value" roughly with "need," while Posner equates it with
the capacity to pay, yielding the one-guy-gets-all scenario as one
12 1
possible ramification.
Posner's maximization-through-exchange conception engenders
an argument in favor of stringent enforcement of contracts against
reluctant parties. Contracts represent voluntary exchanges, it is argued, and since voluntary exchanges represent enhancements in
wealth, contracts should be enforced in the name of wealth maximization. The problem, of course, is that in contract-enforcement
disputes, one party has concluded that performance will actually
contradict her well-being. Contract enforcement therefore becomes
a matter of involuntary exchange rather than voluntary. While it
may be tautologically true that voluntary exchanges improve the
well-being of both parties, the same cannot be said of involuntary
exchanges. Hence, an "efficiency" argument for stringent contract
enforcement becomes dubious. There is, moreover, a fairness question: why should the interests of the party who gains from enforcement be advanced at the expense of the reluctant party? There may
120.
121.

Id. at 356-57 (analyzing relationship between exchanges and wealth maximization).
See id. at 357 (stating desire without ability to pay is irrelevant).
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be many answers to this question, but the focus here will be on Posner's response and its inadequacy.
Posner offers an argument explaining how contract enforcement
is both efficient and fair, based on the intriguing concept of "ex ante
compensation."'' 22 Contracts, Posner argues, are always made in
the context of uncertainty about the future state of the world. A
contract is a presumably rational bet that when time comes for performance the obliged party's gains and losses under the contract
will add up more advantageously than they would have without the
contract. A party will desire release from a contract only when this
anticipated state is not realized and fulfillment of the contract
proves too burdensome relative to the benefits it provides.123 Enforced performance is unfair, that party implicitly argues, because it
entails uncompensated sacrifice.
Not so, Posner argues. The "compensation" that a contract entails is not the actual achievement of some good, but rather the
value of that good discounted by its advance likelihood of realization. Hence, a contractually-obligated party has always received exactly what her obligation of performance secured-a discounted
chance that her well-being might be advanced by some amount at

some designated future moment. Under Posner's view, no obligated party can rightfully plead for release from a contract on
grounds that events have unfolded such that the sacrifice embodied
in performance will go uncompensated. Compensation has, in fact,
already been had, embodied in the probabilistic chance of desirable
outcomes. 24 Contractual expectations are lottery tickets,
purchased at the price of contractual performance. 125
Posner views each party to a contract as implicitly receiving wealth
in the form of a discounted expectation of wealth. Furthermore,
discount-expectational wealth must outweigh in value the obligation
conferred in order to secure it, or the bargain would never have
been struck. Thus, when the contract is fulfilled, each party will gain
122. Id. at 388-89. The ex ante concept means that a contract, viewed at the time it was
made, is almost always sensible because neither party would have signed if he thought it
would turn out badly. Id. According to Posner, simple contracts viewed ixante are Pareto
superior transactions-i.e. they make at least one person better off and no one worse off. Id.
Since events may turn out differently than the parties expected and they may be worse off due
to the contract, however, the transaction after the fact may not be Pareto superior. Id.
123. See R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 388-89. (arguing that uncertain
choices are regarded as mistakes ixpost, but as sensible ex ante).
124. See id. at 389-90 (illustrating ex ante compensation through example of choice between jobs, one paying $50,000 with 100% certainty, the other paying $500,000, but with
only 90% certainty).
125. See id. at 388-90 (concluding that no choice, however wise it appears, is certain to
work out well).
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in discount-expectational wealth more than is given up in actual
wealth. Each party, therefore, gains and overall wealth is maximized
126
when the contract is stringently enforced.
The bizarre character of Posner's reasoning, if not already clear,
stands out sharply when pushed beyond Posner's explicit commentary. Posner assumes each party to be better off when the contract is
enforced, even if the state of the world at that moment is such that
one has wound up with less actual wealth than she had beforehand. 12 7 But if we recall at this point Posner's notion that entitlements should be assigned by courts or by other public authorities to
maximize wealth, it seems that such a body should proceed to rearrange entitlements to mimic the contractual scenario just discussed.
Thus, this authority would take wealth from one party and confer it
on another, granting in return a discounted possibility of wealth
which may not actually materialize. The party deprived of actual
wealth by this efficiency-seeking public authority, however, has no
grounds for complaint. What she got in return might have been
worth a lot, according to the probabilities calculated by the public
authority in the same way that they would be calculated by private
contracting parties. Following the implicit logic of Posner's "efficiency" argument for stringent contract enforcement, therefore, a
state could compel citizens to extend risky loans at interest to other
citizens, while insisting that the reluctant lenders had not been expropriated of wealth, but had in fact been enhanced in their wealth,
even if the loans should ultimately default.
Posner heroically tries to persuade us that economic analysis can
by itself delineate the proper contour of legal entitlements. 128 At
several points in The Problems of Jurisprudence, as in his other work,
Posner provides examples of how he thinks this may be done.
These examples are unconvincing, however, and in their failure
both undermine the simplistic ideologies of market-economy efficiency and emphasize the dependence of entitlement notions on
non-economic moral commitments. One typical example of his entitlement analysis illustrates Posner's weakness. In this example,
Posner compares two situations: damaging someone's business enterprise by launching competition against it, and stealing a neighbor's car.1 2 9 Because the competition victim has no "entitlement"
126. Id.
127. See id at 388 (arguing that wealth maximization can be grounded in Pareto transactions although one or both sides may actually lose).
128. See R. POSNER, JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 81 (stating that wealth maximization resolves distributive considerations automatically).
129. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 440-41.
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against the loss suffered while the theft victim does, the former has
no legal remedy but the latter does.
But why should this be the case? Posner believes that efficiency
analysis explains the recognition of one entitlement and the nonrecognition of the other. Business competition, Posner remarks,
yields a "net increase" in social wealth, while theft yields a "net decrease."1 3 0 Hence, while an entitlement against business competition contradicts wealth maximization, an entitlement against car
expropriation promotes it. Posner assumes that the transfer from
victim to beneficiary in each case results in a net wealth change of
zero, the victim's loss balancing out the beneficiary's gain. With this
assumption established, however, Posner offers no satisfactory argument why competition yields net benefit, although he does explain
the net loss from the theft as the cost of "resources consumed in
committing and preventing thefts."''
Hence, Posner's efficiency
analysis explains why there are entitlements against car expropriation, but not against competition.
This point seems sound until one thinks about it. Thought indicates, however, that in business competition resources are heavily
consumed in "committing and preventing" competition itself.
These expenditures embody social costs exactly like those concerning the prevention of ordinary thefts. Posner's argument about resource waste not only fails to explain which entitlements warrant
recognition, but also highlights a crucial and too seldom mentioned
inefficiency of competitive markets: the enormous dissipation of resources in the competitive struggle itself. This resource waste includes brand advertising, market research, packaging, and trade
secret protection, along with many other resource-guzzling competitive expenditures. Thus, although market competition may yield
real advantages such as technological innovation and energetic effort, it also entails gargantuan economic costs which are generally
ignored in rosy paeans to the efficiency of market arrangements. Innovation and energy may be what Posner has in mind when he indicates that competition augments social wealth, but his position
ignores the possibility that many forms of business competition are
economically wasteful. Efficiency, therefore, cannot justify the prevailing absence of anti-competitive entitlements and may even suggest that we should have more of them.
Posner candidly acknowledges that economic legal analysis encounters "problems" when it inquires as to proper delineations of
130.

Id. at 441.

131.

R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 441.
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entitlements, 13 2 which, of course, is equivalent to saying that it encounters problems when it tries to resolve actual disputes. This
calls into question the value of law and economics in general, since
Posner sees the primary value of economic analysis as assistance in
dispute resolution. Posner vastly underestimates the problems confronting economic analysis over entitlement assignments. His work
is peppered with examples, like the competition/theft example discussed above, which purport to show how economic analysis rationalizes entitlements and resolves cases. Every one of his examples,
however, is vulnerable to attack. The competition/theft example
epitomizes the entire difficulty: efficiency analysis, standing alone,
simply cannot tell us which goods people should have a right to and
which should be up for grabs.
Posner's difficulty is even deeper than the incapacity to show
which entitlement configurations will be more efficient than others.
He does not even establish the more basic notion that one entitlement configuration ever could be more efficient than others. Posner's entire economic jurisprudence is astonishingly obtuse to the
argument established by Coase in a seminal law and economics article. 13 3 With frictionless transacting, Coase suggests, no configuration of entitlements could possibly hamper efficiency because all
valued items would be sold and purchased until the ideal efficient
configuration had been reached.1 3 4 Though Posner is aware of
Coase's point, he persistently ignores it.135 Coase's argument implies that entitlement configurations, though bearing decisively on
distributional outcomes, entail no efficiency consequences whatsoever. This may suggest that entitlement problems are best approached with distributional concerns uppermost. Posner, by
contrast, focuses on efficiency concerns to the exclusion of distributional ones.' 3 6
Coase's simple axiom is notoriously confounded, of course, by the
real world need to consider information and transaction costs. Posner could maintain fealty to Coase by centering his efficiency-seeking entitlements argument around information/transaction cost
132. Id. at 440.
133. See generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. EcON. 1 (1960) (explaining that if
transactions are costless, initial assignment of property rights will not prevent ultimate efficient use of property).
134. See id. at 17-28 (arguing that efficiency with which resources will be employed is unaffected by initial assignments of rights if transaction costs are zero).
135. See R. POSNER, JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 71 (arguing that property rights serve efficiency only in settings with low transaction costs).
136. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing Posner's view of why distributive concerns should be left to legislatures).
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analysis. His efforts to do so are rudimentary, however, perhaps because of the daunting complications introduced by information/
transaction cost analyses.
Where information/transaction costs are positive, efficiency may
turn on correct entitlement assignments because blockages on bargains hamper Coasean wealth-maximizing rearrangements. Hence,
Posner's project might seem theoretically vindicated for the real
world of non-frictionless markets. There is another difficulty, however, this one from the opposite direction. The presence of information/transaction costs may hamper efficiency, precisely because
efficiency-maximizing bargain rearrangements are blocked. Thus,
the law and economics "uncertainty principle" mentioned above
plays itself out here.
Law and economics seeks to promote wealth maximization simultaneously by exalting free exchange and by assigning entitlements
efficiently.13 7 In Coasean friction-free situations, the efficient assignment of entitlements is superfluous, since all problems resolve
themselves through free exchange. In friction-laden situations, by
contrast, assigning entitlements efficiently becomes critical due to
market inefficacies. In such a world, the existing entitlement configurations may be efficiency sub-optimal, because either (a) initial
entitlement assignments were incorrect; or (b) the world has
changed since the initial assignment, making once-efficient configurations inefficient. At a theoretical level, these two possibilities are
really one since the occurrence of the latter reveals the previous
existence of the former. In any case, situations arise in which it is
inefficient to protect a previously recognized entitlement. If information/transaction costs are positive-this problem could never
arise unless they are-contract and market exchange cannot be relied upon to deliver efficiency. At such points, "public law" (such as
tort) rearrangements of extant entitlement configurations become
necessary to serve efficiency. Posner recognizes this point, noting
that when transaction costs are too high, it may be inefficient for law
38
to recognize and protect "absolute" entitlements.1
Here the "uncertainty principle" yields a practical paradox. Efficiency does not indicate when to give strong protection to entitlements, making them subject to rearrangement only through
voluntary exchanges, and when to tinker with wealth allocations
through public law for fear that voluntary exchanges cannot reliably
137. See R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 356-57 (discussing wealth creation
through exchange).
138. R. POSNER, JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 71.
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deliver efficiency. In Coasean low-friction situations, we may boldly
assign absolute entitlements to everything, confident that the market will ensure efficiency. In high-friction situations, by contrast, we
must assign entitlements tentatively, acutely conscious that we may
err damagingly or else need to reconsider perpetually.
Given this predicament, is it worthwhile to organize a jurisprudence around the search for efficient entitlements? In low-friction
situations the search may be superfluous to the goal of efficiency,
and in high-friction situations it may be detrimental to the goal.
Though not articulate as to this dilemma, Posner seems dimly aware
of it. He occasionally suggests we should assume that most situations fall in a middle zone where information/transaction costs are
positive but low. 1 39

In this zone, presumably, friction is high

enough to make the Coasean insight nugatory, yet low enough to
avoid the problem of efficiency-blocking entitlements. The Posnerian methodology makes sense for such a middle zone. The problem, however, is that we have no way of knowing whether such a
middle zone actually exists, either in general or in any particular
situation. In any disputed situation, there is simply no way to tell
whether the operative market friction is too low, too high, or just
right for the assignment of entitlements by Posner's efficiency
criteria.
Posner insightfully notes that contract problems can all be
recharacterized as tort problems, and vice versa. 140 Tort remedies
can be described as vindications of hypothetical bargains the parties
would have struck, but for blockages posed by bargain obstructions,
in seeking their maximum respective advantages. Contract remedies, meanwhile, can be properly measured by the scope of entitlements an efficiency-maximizing tort law would assign for purposes
of subsequent exchange. This truth, however, utterly confounds
Posner's entire jurisprudential myth by making the problem of entitlement assignment and its resolution entirely circular. Tort outcomes actively assign and reset efficient entitlements for future
exchange, yet also passively reflect and vindicate the contractual rearrangement of previously-set entitlements. Conversely, contract
outcomes passively vindicate and reflect the voluntary exchange of
preset entitlements, while, through damage measures and other
doctrines, actively setting and determining the configuration of
those entitlements based on efficiency.
139. See id. (recognizing that zero transaction costs are not realistic).
140. See R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 361 (stating that tort cases have preaccident contract element and contract cases ex ante remedy element).
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Posner's methodology presents us with a quandary over how to
decide when efficiency requires us to protect existing entitlements
and when it requires us to tinker with them. Posner's only suggestion for this dilemma would be to do what is efficient.14 1 The pathos
of Posner is that he is adept enough to discern, albeit dimly, the host
of difficulties confronting his jurisprudential project. He steps
along more and more frantically in his quixotic quest for a grail
which inevitably vanishes before he finds it, impelled onward all the
while by the conviction that it surely must exist.
At the heart of Posner's incoherence is the circularity of his core
notion that entitlements should be assigned to maximize wealth, defined as willingness/ability to pay. This criterion favors, without adequate justification, the interests of the wealthy. The problem is
deeper than this bizarre bias, however. Wealth has no legal meaning other than the enjoyment of certain entitlement preferences. To
have wealth simply is to have certain entitlements delineated in
one's favor: these things are mine, not yours nor anyone else's.
The wealth maximization approach is to allocate entitlements to
whomever is willing or able to pay the most for them. Thus, an entitlement should go to the party most willing or able to sacrifice entitlements already possessed in order to secure the one in question,
with the surreal twist that the party in that position gets the entitlement without actually having to pay for it.
Hence, the decision as to who should get any particular entitlement turns on how previously-settled entitlements were delineated
and then brought to bear in bidding for the disputed entitlement.
But how do we know whether those previously-settled entitlements
have been assigned correctly? Posner's approach tells us whether
those entitlements are correctly delineated by reference to still
other entitlements various claimants have been willing to bid for the
ones now in question. The same is true for these entitlements, and
141. This reminds me of Spike Lee's film, Do the Right Thing. At one point in the film, a
somewhat tiresome busybody elder man, who functions as a sort of neighborhood philosophe, intrusively collars the busy, hassled, and preoccupied young-man-on-the-make
Mookie, played by Spike Lee. The philosophe detains Mookie to impart a crucial piece of life
advice, and the exasperated Mookie is virtually compelled to linger long enough to listen.
"Always do the right thing," the philosophe admonishes Mookie. The anticlimax of this understated message throws Mookie for a complete loop: "That's it?" he cries complainingly.
"Do the right thing? Ok. I got it. I'm gone .. " The philosophe's advice is as powerful and
as frustratingly enigmatic as the Kantian ethic itself. Always do the right thing. But what is
the right thing to do? At the film's climax, Mookie encounters a situation where he feels
especially strongly that he must do the right thing, and he does something which both he and
the viewer may or may not feel was right. Posner'sjurisprudence, distilled to a maxim, can be
stated as, "Do the efficient thing." Posner's admonition, however, turns out to be not just
enigmatic but conceptually empty. This is all the more disappointing since Posner's maxim
lacks in the first place the Kantian power and pathos of Spike Lee's concern.
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so on. Sooner or later the efficient delineation of entitlements becomes circular, with each particular delineation referring to all the
others, including the one originally in question.
This circularity can be escaped only if there is some ultimate baseline, a "correct" initial configuration of entitlements, to serve as the
benchmark for the entire process. This benchmark configuration
constrains and shapes all the subsequently-unfolding legal determinations, according to Posner's theory, yet cannot itself be established by his efficiency method. Posner thus leaves us to ponder
how this original configuration should be settled. Distributive justice, anyone?
IV.

TORT

Posner's jurisprudence should be explored not only in its general
assumptions and method, but also in its arguments as to particular
areas of law. The previous sections examined the pro-wealth conclusions of Posner's basic models. This section and the next explore
the implications of Posner's pro-wealth conclusions in two areas of
law, tort and labor, where his proclivities prompt him highly to favor
privately-owned capital. As discussed above, Posner attempts to
interpret common law doctrinal structures as embodying evolutionary natural efficiency. For example, he asserts the "correctness" of
two cornerstones of the common law structure in tort, the fellow
servant rule for workplace injuries and the negligence standard for
liability in general. Posner asserts the "correctness" of these cornerstones from the viewpoint of efficiency analysis. 14 2 It is illumi-

nating to inspect the economic reasoning Posner embraces in
purporting to vindicate the common law's purported efficiency on
these matters.
Farwell v. Boston and Worcester R.R. ,14 which launched the fellow
servant rule in American law, was for much of the nineteenth century one of the most widely-praised opinions in the entire jurisprudential lexicon. The issue in Farwell was whether a worker injured
on the job through the negligence of a co-worker can recover damages from the employer under vicarious liability. Farwell answers
"no" by analyzing an implicit prior bargain between the victim and
his employer.1 4 4 This resolution of a tort rule issue by referring to
an implicit contract quintessentially foreshadows law and econom142. See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 13, at 44-48 (discussing negligence standard in general and fellow-servant rule in particular as doctrines promoting economic
efficiency).
143. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
144. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 55 (1842).
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ics. Farwell suggests that justice does not require that the victim be
compensated, because he or she has already been compensated in
premium pay for the risk of suffering injury.' 4 5 To order tort damages, therefore, would be to depart from the terms of an implicit
contract whereby the worker agreed to accept a determinate quantum of premium pay in return for working under risky conditions.
In other words, a damage payment would represent double compensation for the worker.
Legal commentators exalted Farwell as exemplifying the highest
arts of common law reasoning.14 6 The opinion and the rule it configured have since fallen into disfavor, reviled as hideous relics of a
harsh age when business interests enjoyed excessive sway over law
and when mean-spirited casuistry of argument prevailed over the
real lives and interests of people. 147 While these criticisms are welltaken, I disagree with their implicit suggestion that modem law and
society have escaped those vices.
Farwell's low modem reputation makes all the more remarkable
its once premier position. Contemporary criticism focuses on the
fact that it neither addressed problems of unbalanced bargaining
power and information failure in employer-employee relations nor
weighed the morality of legitimating voluntary exposure to personal
danger. 148 This critical consensus on Farwell holds sway across a
broad spectrum of political opinion, from left to right. Posner, however, does not join this broad consensus. Posner supports revival of
the fellow servant rule, at least for injuries not covered by worker
compensation schemes. He has written in praise of Farwell149 and in
at least one case comes close to applying it on the bench, although
ultimately rests his anti-recovery ruling on another ground.15 0 Pos145.

d at 57.

146. See R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 87 (1938) (calling rule in Far.
well only decision common law judges of era could have made). Common law judges in the
United States and England also lauded the Farwell decision. See L. LEvy, THE LAW OF THE
COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEFJUSTICE SHAW 171 n.18 (1957) (noting Cranworth, Lord Chancellor adopted Shaw's reasoning in Bartenshill Coal Co. v. Reid, 3 Macq. 266 (1858) and reprinted Farwell therein); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Ross, 112 U.S. 377, 385-86
(1884) (Field,J.) (stating Farwell"exerted great influence" as rule of decision in American and
English courts).
147. See Adlow, ChiefJustice Lemuel Shaw and the Law of Negligence, in TORT LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 67 (K. Hall ed. 1987) (calling Farwell "harsh" and "cruel" in retrospect).
148. See Pomer v. Schoolman, 875 F.2d 1262, 1266 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (acknowledging criticisms of Farwell).
149. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 13, at 309-11 (noting

workers' compensation dilutes workers' incentives to take care, unlike fellow servant rule); see
also Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 13, at 44-45, 67-71 (analyzing fellow servant rule
in industrial accident law).

150. Pomer v. Schoolman, 875 F.2d 1262, 1266, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (call-
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ner offers two main arguments as to why he ,finds Farwell so
impressive.
Posner first argues that the fellow servant rule is efficient in promoting workplace safety. A worker subject to uncompensated injury
by the negligence of co-workers, he suggests, will feel an incentive
to monitor and curb their unsafe work habits.' 5 ' Posner seems to
imagine that workplace peers routinely admonish each other as to
dangerous practices or inform on each other to superiors. His argument justifies the fellow servant rule only if the specific fear of going
uncompensated for injury creates a major independent incentive.
Posner does not explain, however, how the fear of non-compensation imparts any new safety incentive beyond the baseline fear of
injury itself, regardless of whether it will be compensated. Posner
also fails to reckon with people's powerful hesitations to be a busybody or tattle-tale among co-workers. One advantage of workplace
respondeat superior is that it gives the boss, who may be adequately
insulated from peer group dynamics, primary safety responsibility.
Posner's enhanced-safety rationale, moreover, rings true only for
employees who work with each other closely enough to monitor one
another's safety practices. Yet the fellow servant rule defended in
Farwell applies to all co-workers in a firm, not just to those in mutual
52
monitoring situations.1
Posner's second argument is that the Farwell fellow servant rule
reflects the contract-efficiency wisdom of the common law, something he regards as a virtue.1 53 Indeed, since Farwell is an excellent
specimen of economic legal analysis, and a foreshadowing of today's
law and economics, a look at the flaws in that case elucidates the
problems in Posner's jurisprudence.
The standard rejoinders to Farwell's implicit bargain/assumption
of risk argument focus on unequal bargaining power, deficiencies in
foreknowledge and risk assessment, and the pathos of ratifying sales
of personal safety for money. Such rejoinders, though powerful, do
not cut to the decision's internal incoherence-the inability to determine whether the implicit bargain hypothesized in Farwell was actually struck. In fact, the Farwell bargain never could be struck except
ing Farwell "tour-de-force" of economic reasoning but basing holding on fact that liability is
barred when danger is obvious to reasonable person).
151. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 13, at 44-45.
152. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 13, at 309 (identifying
and endorsing tendency of courts to reject proximity limitation to fellow servant rule).
153. See R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 252-53 (analyzing contract theory
inherent in Farwelo.
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under conditions that would contradict both its outcome and justifying rationale.
Farwell's contract argument begins by noting that the victim was
paid more in his post as engineer, in which he was injured, than in
his previous post as machinist, the clear implication being that the
victim therefore received a risk premium for working as an engineer.1 54 If so, justice does not demand, and may even forbid, the
granting of post hoc compensation since the victim received compensation beforehand in the form of premium pay. Farwell does not and
cannot explain, however, how one can be sure that the pay increase
in moving from machinist to engineer actually represented a risk
premium, rather than a premium for increased skills, broader responsibility, or the like. Farwell'sjustifying rationale in denying tort
compensation therefore crucially depends on an undemonstrable
proposition.
Moreover, even if Farwell is correct in assuming that the pay increase represents an implicit bargain to run the risk of injury, this
assumption can justify the rule of non-compensation only upon the
further assumption that the pay hike embodies a premium for the
risk of uncompensated injury. It is plausible, of course, that a worker
exposed to injury risks would seek premium pay even if he expected
injuries to be compensated. Hence, even if the Farwell pay hike is
indeed a bargained risk premium, there is no ground to conclude
that the parties assumed in their minds that injuries would go uncompensated. Farwell assumes the parties entertained that supposition. A contrary scenario, however, is perfectly plausible. The
parties may have assumed that actual injuries would receive compensation, but deemed the risk of injury worthy of premium pay nevertheless. Under this scenario, post-injury compensation would
hardly violate the parties' contractual understanding. It would, instead, ratify it.
At Farwell's core, furthermore, is a contradiction which foreshadows Posner-style law and economics. In order for Farwell's
imagined bargain of premium pay for uncompensated injury to have
actually occurred, the parties must have assumed beforehand a legal
rule-that injuries should receive compensation-which is opposite
to the rule announced by the case. 15 5 Had the parties assumed in
advance that injuries would go uncompensated, the bargain
154.

Id. at 59.

155. Prior to Farwell, the rule of decision in industrial negligence cases was respondeat superior. See Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of IndustrialAccidents, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 50, 52-53 (1967), reprintedin TORT LAw INAMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 147, at 172-73
(tracing respondeat superior doctrine to Blackstone). With the advent of the industrial revolu-
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imagined in Farwell would never have taken place. The employer
would have had no reason to offer premium pay to secure a right
already enjoyed not to pay damages. The worker, meanwhile,
would not have possessed the "bargaining chip" of a right to compensation, to be dealt away in return for premium pay. Farwell's
justifying rationale is that its rule merely implements a bargain between the parties. This bargain, however, could never occur except
under a legal rule precisely opposite to the one Farwell proclaims.
Farwell's rhetorical persuasiveness has much in common with law
and economics. The arguments are driven along from their simple
and apparently plausible premises to their strikingly concrete conclusions by crucial but unarticulated assumptions. These assumptions go unnoticed and therefore uncriticized, which lends the
whole argument a deceptive appearance of solidity. Farwell exemplifies one genre of the law and economics lexicon, the resolution of
tort issues by reference to implicit contracts. With Farwell, as with
Posner, the class character of the jurisprudence emerges in the covert assumptions which tilt the outcomes in favor of private capital.
The Farwell paradox can be seen from another viewpoint, if one
imagines how difficult it might have been to explain the "justice" of
the fellow servant rule to the first post-Farwell injury victim. This
next victim cannot be comforted by being told how her non-recovery effectuates a bargain she struck earlier, to trade away a right to
recover in return for premium pay. This victim could never have
received that premium, precisely because the Farwell ruling has already deprived her of what she might have used to bargain for it.
Farwell epitomizes the tendency of law and economics analysis to
resolve entitlement disputes by positing the outcomes of imaginary
contracts. Those imaginary contracts necessarily assume pre-contract entitlement configurations, themselves supposedly determined
by prior contracts, and so on all the way down. This entire scheme
can avoid bottomlessness or circularity only if it posits a scheme of
original entitlements which perpetually reset themselves after each
contractual rearrangement. Thus, the law and economics method
must posit a scheme of entitlements which is forever alterable, yet
perpetually fixed. Here again one observes the law and economics
"uncertainty principle" mentioned above. The implications of this
are devastating because any entitlement whatsoever can be a candidate for inclusion in the original scheme. In Farwell, the moment of
perpetual re-set emerges immediately. For parties to strike the bartion, the fellow servant rule took hold. Id. at 53, reprintedin TORT LAW
supra note 147, at 173.
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gain of premium pay for uncompensated injuries that justifies the
fellow servant rule, the rule must perpetually be undone to allow
those bargains to be struck. Posner is right to portray Farwell as an
exemplar of how common law reasoning anticipates law and
economics.
In addition to defending the fellow servant and assumption of risk
doctrines, Posner has argued zealously in the past on efficiency
grounds that negligence, as opposed to strict liability, is the proper
general standard of tort liability.' 5 6 Economic analysis of the negligence/strict liability argument has grown quite intricate and Posner
has in fact gradually retreated from this pro-negligence position. In
The Problems ofJurispmrdence, he does little more than suggest certain
insurance advantages of a negligence standard over strict liability,
assuming negligence is the more efficient standard from the standpoint of wealth maximization. 157 Though this assumption may reveal that Posner still views negligence as the more efficient standard,
he avoids any attempt to prove that it is. In Economic Analysis of Law,
moreover, Posner takes the fairly moderate position that efficiency
advantages lie with strict liability in some situations and with negligence in others.15 8
Although Posner has attempted to defend the efficient character
of the negligence standard, 15 9 his arguments closely read have concentrated on the modest claim that negligence is no less efficient than
strict liability. Using Judge Learned Hand's B> < PxL formula,
where B represents the economic cost or burden of preventing an
accident, L represents its economic magnitude, and P represents its
probability of occurrence, Posner defines negligence as the failure
to take precautions to prevent an accident in situations where
B<PxL. 160 Under a negligence standard so defined, Posner explains, defendant liability would not lie where B>PxL, when what
the defendant might have spent to avoid the mishap exceeded the
accident's cost, discounted according to its likelihood of occurrence.
Posner embraces an explicitly wealth-biased view of how the BPL
approach should be applied, in that it identifies negligence more
156. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 13, at 64-66 (illustrating difference between negligence and strict liability rules in efficiency terms).
157. R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 390-91.
158. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 160-65.
159. See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 13, at 30 (stating negligence standard is
"broadly consistent with an optimum investment in accident prevention").
160. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (introducing formula); R. POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 358.
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readily for rich victims than for poor victims.' 6 1 This is because the
L factor, the accident cost as conventionally measured by our tort
system, is higher for rich than for poor victims when lost income is
factored in. Thus, an injurer having spent a given sum B in precautions may be found negligent because B<PxL if a rich person has
been injured, but non-negligent because B >PxL where a poor person has been hurt. Under this conception a firm may have an incentive to spend less on safety if the factory is in a black neighborhood
and employs mostly women workers than if it sits in a white neighborhood and employs primarily males.
Posner neither acknowledges nor responds to this wealth-bias
problem. On the contrary, his concern is that application of the
BPL formula may not be wealth-biased enough. He insists that if
the BPL approach is properly applied, the L factor for injured rich
people must be inflated relative to that for poor people, not only for
the higher actual income foregone, but also to count in the higher
opportunity costs of income possibilities foreclosed when rich people suffer injury. Under this view it might have constituted actionable negligence during the eighties to interrupt Donald Trump with a
62
wrong number.1
Continuing to apply Hand's definition, Posner asserts strict liability must mean the imposition of liability even in situations where
B > PxL, not just where B < PxL as the negligence standard would
indicate.16 3 In lay terms, Posner suggests that strict liability requires
the imposition of liability even in situations where accident-avoidance spending would be inefficient because its magnitude exceeds
the probable economic losses avoided. Posner uses this framework
to argue that strict liability provides no efficiency advantages over
negligence. 16 4 Negligence, in other words, is at least as efficient as
strict liability. Although he does not explicitly claim that negligence
exceeds strict liability in efficiency, Posner's focus on negligence and
his fascination with its supposedly efficient character may lead one
to believe that his argument, if sound, establishes the superiority of
the negligence standard.
Posner's effort to demonstrate efficiency parity, if not superiority,
for the negligence standard has serious weaknesses. In his discus161. See Vandall, supra note 97, at 390-92, 408-16 (criticizing Posner's wealth-maximizing
jurisprudence and Hand formula).
162. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 13, at 67-68 (stating
when reduction in income is greater than sum of expected damages to another and costs of
care, risky activity should not be reduced).
163. See id at 72-73 (asking and answering question of why negligence cases exist).
164. See id. at 71 (stating it is impossible to pronounce strict liability economically superior
to negligence "across the board").
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sion of product liability, Posner argues, Coase-style, that market
forces will produce efficiently safe products whether the tort standard is strict liability, negligence, or no liability at all. In Posner's
view any product, to a consumer, has two elements of total costthe actual purchase price and the probabilized cost of any injuries
the product may inflict. By reducing a product's danger level, a producer reduces the total cost faced by its consumers. Consumers will
then favor that product over its competitors, providing profit advantages for the producer of the safety-improved product. Hence, Posner argues, producers feel incentives to implement all cost-justified
safety precautions which reduce probabilized injury costs by more
than the precaution costs themselves. 16 5 Regardless of tort rules,
therefore, market forces yield efficiently safe products.
Posner's argument, however, manifests a fundamental oversight.
He is correct that if certain assumptions as to the competitive nature
of the seller market hold true, cost-justified precautions will secure
revenue advantages for firms adopting them. He is wrong, however,
to assume that profit-maximizing firms would adopt all such revenue-enhancing precautions. Increased revenues do not mean increased profits unless those increased revenues exceed any
increased costs incurred to secure them. Posner's notion of "costjustified" compares the costs of precautions to their safety benefits. 166 Precautions that are "cost-justified" in this sense may indeed
yield revenue enhancements. Firms will incur the costs of these
"cost-justified" precautions, however, only if they are cost-justified
in a different sense, yielding revenue enhancements sufficient to offset the costs actually imposed by the precautionary steps. Situations
of this sort are only a fractional subset of those that are "cost-justified" from an overall social perspective. Hence, Posner's view
notwithstanding, market forces will not dependably yield efficiently
safe products. On the contrary, in any situation where optimal
safety would entail additional expenditures from producers, market
incentives are insufficient to induce optimal safety.
This slippage, the difference between socially optimal precautions
and those yielding revenue benefits exceeding the precaution costs
themselves, will not appear if the firm can pass precaution costs, in
the form of higher prices, entirely through to consumers. In that
case, firms would feel the proper market incentive to take all socially
efficient safety precautions, identifiable as those for which consum165. See iit at 275-80 (analyzing market behavior under different products liability
standards).
166. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 13, at 293.
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ers would willingly pay. This, however, is possible only under particular market conditions. Moreover, Posner's entire argument here
presupposes that consumers shop efficiently for safety among competing products. It is doubtful that consumer safety markets operate well enough to validate Posner's argument. While Posner
acknowledges this problem, he terms it "superficial," noting that
competition among sellers generates safety information for consumers.1 67 Although this may be true, the question is whether the information so generated is sufficient to promote efficient consumer
behavior. After all, advertising deluges consumers with messages
about products that appeal to urges far less rational than concern
for safety. Posner concedes, moreover, that sellers may actually
hesitate to publicize safety information for fear it may stimulate previously dormant concerns over product dangers, and thereby hamper sales rather than augment them. Hence, Posner acknowledges
that the abandonment of caveat emptor in product liability, in favor
of negligence, was correct,168 but nevertheless insists that to go further in the same direction and supplant negligence with strict liability would be undesirable. Posner offers no argument, however, why
the considerations justifying the move from caveat emptor to negligence would not equally favor the move from negligence to strict
liability.169

Posner recognizes that victim incentives must be considered as
well. Where buyers can prevent accidents through altered use more
cheaply than sellers can by altering products, buyers will prefer to
take precautions themselves rather than pay higher costs for altered
products. 70 If we entertain here as well the assumptions Posner
must be making-for example, that the market is such that all new
producer costs are passed along to buyers-his argument is indeed
revealing. The buyer incentives Posner highlights would operate
without slippage regardless which tort liability rule prevailed. Buyers will take all socially cost-justified precautions costing less than
the precautions sellers could take, with the costs of those seller precautions passed along to buyers. Sellers, however, will not take all
socially cost-justified precautions costing less than those that a
buyer could take, but will instead take only those that are profitenhancing as argued above. Hence, buyer behavior corresponds
more closely to overall social efficiency than seller behavior. No
167. Posner, Strict Liability, supra note 13, at 211.
168. Posner, Strict Liability, supra note 13, at 211.
169. Id.
170. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCrURE, supra note 13, at 276-80 (showing how, under products liability standards, market determines who bears cost of care).
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slippage occurs between "cost-justified" behavior and "profit-justified" behavior on the buyer's side because, unlike the seller's, the
buyer's "profit" factor is identical to the value of avoided injuries.
The fact that market forces do not impel efficient levels of precautionary spending by the producer underscores the importance of
tort standards. Therefore, strict liability should be applied to producers because incentive slippage occurs only on the producer side.
Common sense suggests that strict liability, by making producers
liable for a wider range of mishaps, stiffens safety incentives, encouraging efficient levels of precautionary spending. Posner purportedly cuts the legs out from under this common sense argument.
Under Hand's definition of negligence, failure to take precautions at
the efficient level, strict liability cannot provide more efficiency or
safety than a negligence standard. There is, however, another flaw
in Posner's argument at this point, which could be called the "phantom accounting" problem. Under strict liability, a producer assessing possible safety measures will weigh their costs against the costs
of injuries estimated as preventable by the various precautions. The
firm will then act efficiently. Under a negligence standard, however,
firms will estimate paying damages only at some fraction of the actual costs of injuries, since only part of the total accident costs will
be deemed attributable to negligence. 17 1 Hence, under a negligence standard, profit-making firms will adopt sub-optimal levels of
safety precautions.
Posner might hold that this sub-optimality would not occur because courts would find firms liable for making sub-optimal decisions.
Courts, however, could accomplish this only by
hypothesizing that firms make mistakes about optimal safety spending, mistakes now defined as negligence, mistakes that occur only
because negligence is the standard firms face. As the ironic result,
negligence appears as the sub-optimal decisionmaking that arises
from establishing a negligence standard. A perfect optimizing firm,
by contrast, optimizes social efficiency, not just its own profits. Such
a firm would never allow an accident to happen unless it were socially efficient to do so.
In other words, the optimizing firm must act as if it would pay the
full social costs of its injuries, as it would have to under strict liability, even if the actual prevailing standard is negligence. To act in
consonance with true optimality, a firm must engage in "phantom"
cost accounting, behaving as if strict liability is the standard, even if
it is not. A court purporting to apply a negligence standard cannot
171.

Id. at 277-80.
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treat firms as if they have correctly applied the efficiency norm. A
court so acting would never find liability. The court must instead
assume the possibility of efficiency mistakes by firms and impose liability accordingly. Such mistakes can be eliminated only through
the consistent imposition of strict liability. Otherwise, the court
must, under a negligence standard, try to assess which injuries represent efficiency "mistakes." This requires a determination of
whether the firm made the same decision under negligence which it
would have made under strict liability. To yield efficiency, therefore, Posner's negligence standard would require courts to inquire
whether firms have correctly implemented what strict liability would
require. Therefore, efficiency would be better served by straightforward strict liability.
V.

LABOR

In recent years, Posner has trained his scholarly sights on labor

law. 17 2 His main themes are that unions produce economic inefficiency and that the Wagner Act structure enhances union power,
thus fostering inefficiency. 173 Although Posner purports to address
these themes in the neutral spirit of economic science by taking no
position on whether unions and union-protective law are bad or
good, the belief that union power intrinsically yields inefficiency seriously undermines the legitimacy of unions and union-protective
law. Moreover, since his work as a whole stands for the proposition
that inefficiency is bad and that the law should strive to curtail it,
Posner's self-described neutral stance is disingenuous.
Posner's efforts come as part of a wave of attacks from the right
during the seventies and eighties on the Wagner Act and other supposedly union-protective law. Posner endorses this literature as a
preface to his own contributions to the critique.' 74 In endorsing
this literature uncritically, Posner undermines his own credibility
from the outset. For example, Posner refers favorably to two articles by Epstein 175 which put forth arguments of uncommon silliness.
172. See generally Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, supra note 13 (outlining Posner's
application of economics to labor law); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 299316.
173. See Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, supra note 13, at 990 (arguing that American
labor law as epitomized by Wagner Act is inconsistent with economists' desire for competition
and efficiency).
174. See id. at 990 n.9, 991 (endorsing Epstein's views on labor law as similar to his own).
With apologies to Marx, see Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in THE
MARx-ENGELS READER 3 (Tucker ed. 1978).
175. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, supra note 13, at 990 n.9 (citing Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Legislation, 92 YALE LJ. 1357 (1983)
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A discussion of one of Epstein's arguments indicates what Posner is
apparently willing to accept at face value.
In both articles, Epstein tries to refute the insight that unions, by
enhancing worker bargaining power through collective strength,
offset the bargaining advantage firms enjoy when dealing with workers individually.' 76 The asymmetry in bargaining power in the absence of unions emerges from the straightforward fact that almost
every worker needs a job more than any particular firm needs that
particular worker to fill a job. Because the existence of unequal bargaining power legitimates union power, the anti-union right finds it
ideologically unacceptable and therefore downplays or ignores it.
As Epstein argues, bargaining power in labor markets simply does
not exist, and its nonexistence can be demonstrated empirically.
His argument is simple. If unequal bargaining power existed, firms
would wield it to force worker wages down to zero. Since worker
wages in the real world are not at zero, unequal bargaining power
must not exist; the hypothesis of its existence is contradicted by empirical observation!17 7 Since Epstein offers this argument in two
separate articles, we must assume it is no slip of the pen but is meant
to be taken seriously. One must reluctantly conclude that Posner
also takes it seriously, since he does endorse Epstein's articles without noting any reservations on this or other arugments within them.
It is amusing to bear in mind that these men claim authority for their
views by donning the mantle of hard-headed economic analysis, castigating their antagonists as mush-brained ideologues. The obfuscation in Epstein's argument is immense, especially in its failure to
conceptualize any difference between relative and absolute power
dominance.
Posner's own arguments do not rise to a level much higher than
Epstein's. Posner indicts the Wagner Act for helping unions to
"cartelize" labor supplies, thus hiking wage levels above those that
would prevail under "unregulated competition."' 17 His grievance,
presumably, is that this non-competitive pricing distorts the market
and thereby stymies efficiency. Posner relies on the fallacious no[hereinafter Common Law]); Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 947
(1984) [hereinafter Epstein, Contract at WiltJ.
176. Epstein, Common Law, supra note 175, at 1366 (arguing that identity of contracting
parties is irrelevant and that special protection for workers is not necessary).
177. See Epstein, Common Law, supra note 175, at 1371-72 (arguing that because wages
were not forced to zero prior to Wagner Act, unequal bargaining power is factually refuted);
see also Epstein, Contract at Will, supra note 175, at 973-77 (discussing inequality of bargaining
power in employment at will context).
178. See Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, supra note 13, at 990 (arguing that American
labor law is best understood as device for facilitating cartelization of labor supply by unions).
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tion that there is such a thing as "unregulated" competition, which
can serve as a benchmark for legal and economic analysis. Unions
do not, however, release wages from determination by "unregulated" competitive forces. They merely alter the regulatory framework within which competition operates, yielding a different pattern
of distributional outcomes. Union-protective labor law redefines
the entitlements at work in the employment relationship. Firms, for
example, are stripped of some of their power to discharge, while
workers are granted the right not to be fired for their union support. 17 9 This new state of affairs is no more "regulated" than the
old one which defended business power to make discharges and
gave no protection to workers who supported unions. Since all entitlement schemes are legally protected and enforced, none can be
called "unregulated." Thus, there is no basis for opposing a legal
change as inefficient simply because it departs from an "unregulated" state of affairs which does not exist.
Posner assumes that under anti-union common law, labor was
priced at the proper "competitive" level. Unlike Epstein, Posner
does not explicitly reject the notion that firms dealing with isolated
workers might enjoy bargaining advantages which allow them to distort wages below the hypothetical competitive level.18 0 Nevertheless,
by positing that "competitive" wage levels existed under the common law, Posner implicitly accepts Epstein's position that no unequal bargaining power, no employer monopoly power through
control of scarce jobs, was operative. Because Posner assumes that
common law wage bargains were "competitive," he can easily portray departures from common law rules as departures from "com8
petitive" wage levels.1
Like Epstein, Posner defends common law enforcement of "yellow dog" contracts, under which workers agreed to shun union
membership as a condition for their employment. Posner argues
that enforcement of these contracts was sound because workers obtained wage premiums in return for forsaking their legal rights to
join unions.' 8 2 Any such wage premiums, however, could not have
amounted to much in most cases, precisely because unions were so
weak, partly due to "yellow dog" contracts themselves. If a worker
knows that everyone else in the firm has signed a no-union pledge,
179. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) (prohibiting termination of employee because of union affiliation).
180. See Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, supra note 13, at 991 (arguing that unions
were designed to raise wages above existing competitive level).
181. See id. (outlining view that common law promotes efficiency).
182. Id.
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she knows that her abstract legal right to join a union can do her
little good and probably will not demand much as a price for giving
it up. Other legal restrictions with union-weakening effects, such as
restrictions on picketing or secondary boycotts, will similarly shrink
the price of forgoing the right to join a union.
Posner does not mourn the fact that wage premiums for yellow
dog contracts were probably minimal. More generous premiums,
he argues, would represent a form of monopoly rent for workers.18 3
By this, Posner means that the increase in worker income that stems
from unionization represents a return on union "monopoly" in the
labor market, which departs from "competitive" wage levels. If so,
wage premiums secured by pledging not to unionize also implicitly
represent the fruits of "monopoly." It is ideologically revealing that
Posner introduces the term "monopoly" first in reference to union
power, not employer power. Employer power does not bother him
as a departure from balanced competition. Posner later concedes
that when employers deal with unions, the situation can be described as one of "bilateral monopoly."' 8 4 This seems to suggest
that removal of unions, through a union-hostile common law, would
result in a unilateral monopoly favoring employers and allowing
them to press wages below the proper "competitive" level. Posner
has great difficulty acknowledging this point, however.
Posner's position seems to partake of a more general fallacy, in
mainstream market analysis, which frequently denies or downplays
the overtones of monopoly when large employers confront a dispersed multitude of potential workers. The ubiquity of this situation may indicate a systematic downward departure in wages from
their proper "competitive" levels. This implies massive and thoroughgoing economic inefficiency, if efficiency turns on "competitive" pricing. It further implies systemic unfairness to workers, if
fairness is equated to "competitive" pricing.
These disturbing implications are partially hidden by a picture of
one-on-one dealings-single firms dealing with single workers.
When firms and workers act as individual units, according to this
picture, neither side exerts any market distorting "monopoly"
power over the other. Monopoly emerges only when the firm
"units" or worker "units" act in concert or merge into larger entities such as business cartels or unions. This conclusion seems reassuring as long as one avoids asking what constitutes a non183. Id
184. See id. at 997 (outlining bilateral monopoly in which refusal to deal by one side imposes costs on other side and makes other side more likely to come to terms).
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monopolistic isolated unit. The picture changes radically, however,
if one characterizes a business firm not as a unit but as an aggregate
of units of capital, all acting in concert to secure maximum income.
If the supposedly "competitive" market consists of disaggregated
units of labor striking deals with disaggregated units of capital such
as shares of stock or dollars, any wage negotiation involving a large
enterprise can be described as a confrontation with a cartel of capital units. There is no reason why firms rather than shares, dollars,
or something else should be deemed the paradigmatic unit for determining whether the situation involves "monopoly." The same is
true for labor. There is no reason other than sheer convenience
that the individual worker, rather than a union or perhaps one nanosecond of work, should be denominated as the unit of analysis in
assessing whether conditions are "competitive" or "monopolistic."
With this relativity in what may be designated a unit of capital or
labor, the very concept of a "competitive" wage level collapses into
meaninglessness.
Posner manifests this general fallacy when he mentions the limited and special conditions under which he might deem employer
monopsony power to be cause for concern. Employers might join
"conspiracies" to depress wages, for example.' 8 5 Posner's "conspiracy" image reveals his implicit treatment of the firm as the natural unit of market analysis, with "monopoly" manifesting itself only
when separate firms conspire. He also assumes this when he acknowledges a possible monopoly problem when antitrust laws
against "employer cartels" are weakly enforced. 18 6 Posner does
concede that certain circumstances, such as low worker education
levels, overabundance of immigrant labor, "limited" numbers of
employers in "some markets," and obstacles to labor mobility such
as over-specialization or abnormal ties to particular localities, suggest monopolistic perversion of competitive wage levels. 187 Posner's itemized list, however, suggests that disproportionate
employer bargaining power occurs only as a departure from normal
conditions.
Posner appears fair-minded when he admits that these departures
from normality "may" once have been prevalent, but only in the
185. See Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, supra note 13, at 991-92 (stating that employer monopsony power might exist where workers are ignorant of alternative employment
opportunities, where workers would incur heavy costs in changing jobs, and where employers
conspired to depress wages).
186. Id. at 992.
187. Id. at 991-92.
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past. 18s Even if one narrowly defines the problem by Posner's list,
however, nothing about the late twentieth century, except perhaps
the weak union-protective legislation Posner decries, suggests that
the problem has been banished. Posner suggests that we can be at
ease even about the bad old days, in America at least. He points out
that labor was scarcer in America prior to World War I than elsewhere and that wages were higher here.18 9 Though Posner suggests
that these factors disprove any contention of employer monopoly
power on these shores, his point is a non sequitur. The fact that
American labor held greater bargaining power than did Eurasian labor does not mean it did not face unequal bargaining power with
respect to American capital.
Posner revealingly and accurately characterizes employer firings
of union members or activists as "rational predatory action." 190
The Wagner Act framework, of course, purports to strengthen unions by placing constraints on such action.1 91 It attempts to alter
market structure by ensuring that firms that do not fire union members will not be outcompeted by firms that do. Posner's discussion
rests on his uncritical assumption that the Wagner Act framework
succeeds in accomplishing this purpose. 92 Posner betrays no inkling of the substantial literature suggesting that the Wagner Act
framework, as interpreted and applied, has proved largely impotent
in augmenting union power.' 93 This omission alone disqualifies
him as a serious commentator on the subject.
Despite Posner's blithe assumption that the bad old days are
gone, worker weakness in bargaining position has not disappeared.
It may in fact have worsened in the past two decades as a result of
chronic economic stagnation, accelerating capital mobility, mounting anti-union aggressiveness and expertise among employers, the
diminishing effectiveness of labor law in protecting union activity,
and the continuing decline in private-sector union membership.
Posner nevertheless clings to the notion that the Wagner Act framework tilts power excessively in favor of workers and against employers.' 94 It seems not entirely accidental that Posner fails to discuss
188. See id at 992 (indicating that such market distortions were present in 1935 when
Wagner Act was passed).
189. Id
190. See id at 994 (defining term as firing of pro-union employees to deter unionization).
191. Id.; see Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157-158 (1982)) (protecting employees engaging in organizing activities and prohibiting
employers from interfering in such activities).
192.
193.
194.

Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, supra note 13, at 994-95.
See supra note 27 (providing sampling of articles in field of labor law).
See Bierman,JudgePosnerand the NLRB: ImplicationsforLabor Law Reform, 69 U. MINN.

1991]

POSNER'S JURISPRUDENCE OF CLASS

whole topic areas, such as multi-employer bargaining, secondary
boycotts, and successorship-where the law's basic assumptions are
pro-employer. 195 Instead, Posner misleadingly ferrets out aspects
of the framework he can portray as tendentiously anti-employer.
In his discussion of unionization election campaigns, for example,
Posner highlights the prohibitions on anti-union discharges and interference, on threats of retaliation for union victory, and on
promises of benefit in the event of union defeat. 196 His subtext
seems to be that such prohibitions are over-restrictive since employers "are more limited in what they are allowed to say than are candidates and supporters in political elections."' 9 7 In political
campaigns, "promises of benefits" are a "staple."' 9 8 Posner has
nothing to say about the fact that employer speech restrictions may
be appropriate for unionization elections because they factor out
the coercive power implicit in employer statements. He also ignores
the question of why employers should be allowed to speak or otherwise intervene at all in a process purporting to promote the best
interests of workers. By the logic of countenancing employer
speech in unionization campaigns, foreign governments should be
allowed to contribute to United States presidential campaigns and
schoolteachers should be allowed to endorse candidates in student
council elections. Moreover, the employer speech prerogative
seems especially anomalous in view of the fact that workers typically
enjoy no entree whatsoever to company board or stockholder
meetings.
Posner's blinkered focus emerges again in his discussion of employer power to break and deter strikes by hiring permanent
replacements for strikers. Posner makes the odd observation that
hiring permanent replacements would "never be necessary" if employers could legally hire temporary employees at a premium wage
higher than that paid to the striking workers.' 9 9 He then complains
that prohibition on such action tilts power in favor of workers in the
20 0
eventual resolution of the dispute.
Posner's emphasis here is obfuscating. Any pro-worker effect of
the premium wage prohibition only partially offsets the pro-emL. REV. 881 , 904-07 (1985) (citing evidence of National Labor Relations Board's bias toward
political party in control means Board is not continuously pro-union).
195. See Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, supra note 13, at 999 (explaining away omission of these topics because of time and space constraints).
196. Id. at 995-96.

197. Id.
198.
199.
200.

l at 996.
Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, supra note 13, at 997.
Id. at 997-98.
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ployer tilt inherent in the employer's right to hire permanent
replacements in the first place. The wage ceiling may limit the employer's advantage in being free to hire permanent replacements,
but it does not eliminate it. Posner implies that firms resort to permanent replacements only because laws prohibiting premium wages
for temporary replacements make it "necessary" to woo replacements with offers of permanent status. This picture does not comprehend the realities of economic struggle. It ignores reasons why
employers would hire permanent replacements, other than difficulty
in wooing temporary ones.

In the real world, the option to hire permanent replacements
equips employers with several concrete advantages. Strikes are deterred or broken by worker fears of job loss, while the long-term
proportion of union support in bargaining units is weakened by the
diluting effect of permanent replacements whose attitudes and interests may be union-hostile. Posner errs grievously in suggesting
that these employer advantages stem from the fact that the replacement premium wages areforbidden, rather than from the more funda-

20
mental fact that hiring permanent replacements is allowed. '
Posner's position on the negative efficiency impact of unionization, which rests on the dubious "competitive wage" notions explored above, is vulnerable from another direction if unionization
fosters higher productivity. If this is the case, the supposedly antiefficiency effect of union wage pricing must be weighed against the
pro-efficiency effect of enhanced productivity. Posner is troubled,
therefore, by studies showing that unionization does on average promote productivity by reducing worker turnover, enhancing workplace morale, harnessing worker "voice" to augment rational
management, and impelling raised wages, thus furnishing employers with incentives to invest more capital per worker. 20 2 Rather than
accepting this conclusion or disputing the evidence on its own
terms, Posner insists that it cannot be true. If unionization promotes
productivity, he argues, employers would encourage it, not resist it,
because enhanced productivity enhances profit. 20 3 The fact that
employers fight unions fiercely proves that unions hamper productivity, thinks Posner.
201. See Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, supra note 13, at 997-98 (outlining Posner's
view of balance of power).
202.

See R. FREEMAN ANDJ. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 162-80 (1984) (outlining mod-

em quantitative analysis which indicates unions raise productivity in most circumstances).
203. See Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, supra note 13, at 1000-01 (stating theory that
unionization promotes productivity is hard to accept because it is inconsistent with economic
assumption that employers are profit or utility maximizers and would thus accept unions if
they were more productive).
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Posner's argument is wrong because his premise is false. Enhanced productivity does not necessarily mean enhanced profits.
Important studies indicate that unionization can reduce profits
through its wage hike effect while simultaneously augmenting productivity through other effects. 20 4 Firms fight unions because they
abridge profits, not because they hamper productivity. Moreover, if
it is true that unions actually enhance productivity, employer resistance contradicts, rather than augments, economic efficiency. Posner
fails to address this because he apparently does not discern the possibility that unionization, through increased bargaining power,
might secure wage hikes over and above whatever productivity enhancement it contributes. 20 5 His argument manages to overlook
both the obviousness of this possibility and the fact that it is confirmed by leading studies in the field.
In addition to attacking unions, Posner has also attacked laborprotective minimum wage and safety legislation, as well as judicial
departures from the common law rule of employment at will, as inconsonant with efficiency. 20 6 Although there are significant
problems in Posner's analysis of each of these, I focus on his discussion of the "employment at will" issue, which exemplifies the fallacies in his economic analysis of entitlements, including inattention
to the offer price/asking price issue.
The employment at will rule, which could also be called the "discharge at will" rule, denies most American workers any legally-protected job security. Epstein offers the astonishing argument that
this rule prevails because employment at will is beneficial both to
firms and to workers. 20 7 Epstein's suggestion that the rule benefits
workers by leaving them free to leave theirjobs at will 20 8 is an utter
non sequitur. Worker freedom to depart a job at will has no bearing
on the employment at will rule, which concerns employer freedom
to fire a worker at will. Epstein's point only makes sense if he assumes that workers could not be given the right of departure at will
without a concomitant employer right to discharge at will. There is,
however, no reason whatsoever why the worker's departure right
204. See R. FREEMAN AND J. MEDOFF, supra note 202, at 162-80 (reporting evidence that
union workers are generally more productive than their non-union counterparts).
205. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, supra note 13, at 1001. Posner writes that employers would not resist productivity-enhancing unionization because, "[e]ven if the whole
productivity gain is paid to the employee in the form of a higher wage, the employer will be
better off," due to competitive advantages the hike in productivity confers. lId He does not
ask what happens if the wage goes up by more than the productivity gain. Id
206.

R. POSNER, EcONOMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 306-12.

207.

Epstein, Contract at Will, supra note 175, at 966-67.

208.

Id.
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must be symmetrical to the employer's discharge right, aside perhaps from a misplaced concern that asymmetry would be "unfair" to
employers.
Epstein also insists that the employment at will rule must be "beneficial" to both parties, and presumably "efficient" in Posner's eyes,
since such arrangements are more common than any other type of
employment contract. 20 9 Epstein ignores the possibility that the
prevalence of discharge at will contracts stems from the law's enforced presumption that employment contracts entail discharge at
will. Workers desiring escape from the employment at will rule
must secure, at the expense of reduced compensation, explicit contractual terms providing job security. Epstein's suggestion that both
parties must be "better off" under the discharge at will rule or else
the employment contract would not be struck misses the point completely. A worker may, of course, be "better off" with employment
at will than with no job at all. This does not mean, however, that she
would not be better off still with job security. Epstein's presentation
obfuscatingly suggests that since employment at will is so common,
workers would be worse off under conditions of greaterjob security.
At this point Posner enters the discussion, citing Epstein exclusively. 210 Posner offers three different arguments on efficiency
grounds in defense of discharge at will. Each argument, although
not as preposterous as Epstein's, is faulty for a different reason.
Posner first suggests that discharge at will must be efficient because
if a contrary requirement of job security were efficient, the parties
"voluntarily" would negotiate for such a requirement. 21' Posner
fails to discern this discussion as a classic context for Coasean analysis of entitlement assignments.
If discharge at will is "optimal," to use Posner's term, the parties
may arrive at it through voluntary negotiation, just as Posner suggests, whatever the legal rule may be. Imagine two different entitlement configurations, one under which an employer may discharge at
will, the other under which the worker has some entitlement to job
security. If the latter entitlement configuration were chosen as the
initial posture, the parties would remain free to negotiate a departure, replacing the original configuration with one under which the
worker could be discharged at will. Presumably the worker would
secure some compensation premium in return for sacrificing job security. There is thus no reason from an efficiency standpoint not to
209.

Id. at 965.

210. See R.
211.

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note

Id at 307.

13, at 315.
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confer an entitlement ofjob security, even if it might be a sub-optimal initial assignment.
This analysis falters, of course, if information/transaction costs
block the move from "sub-optimal" job security to "optimal" discharge at will. Posner does not, however, rest his case on the problem of transaction costs. He instead insists that deal-blocking costs
are low in this context, 2 12 a position he must take lest someone point
out that the discharge at will rule might actually be sub-optimal, but
prevalent because of blockages on optimizing moves to job security
contracts. If that were the case, of course, efficiency would demand
the replacement of the discharge at will rule with one protecting job
security to ensure optimality.
Posner follows his voluntary negotiation argument by another argument which seems to anticipate the rejoinder just raised. Assuming discharge at will as the normative original configuration, Posner
argues that the fact that job security contracts are not arrived at
must be because employer losses in sacrificing the discharge at will
2 13
entitlement outweigh worker gains of obtaining job security.
Hence, workers will not pay employers enough to "buy" the entitlement. To Posner, this means that the entitlement in question has
more "value" to the employer than to the worker and the discharge
at will entitlement therefore comports with efficiency. This argument is distinct from both the transaction-blockage argument and
Epstein's position that the discharge at will rule is efficient because
both parties gain. Posner recognizes the obvious fact that one party
gains and the other loses under the discharge at will rule, but nevertheless proclaims its efficiency because the gain outweighs the
loss. 2 14

To claim even-handedness, Posner must assume that the average
contractual outcome, discharge at will, is not determined by the selection of discharge at will as the initial entitlement configuration.
This assumption, however, cannot stand. In a regime recognizing a
job security entitlement, worker bargaining power and wealth would
be enhanced since workers could either enjoy the entitlement or
trade it away to secure other wealth. Firms, by the same token,
would possess less wealth. Therefore, each party would be affected
in its willingness/ability to pay for any particular negotiated entitlement. Willingness/ability to pay is a function of how much wealth
one has. Under such a regime workers would be willing/able to pay
212.
213.

ld.

214.

R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 307.

Id.
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more for the entitlement in question, while firms would be willing/
able to pay less. Hence, in a regime offering an initial entitlement of
job security, employment contracts providing job security would be
more common than they are where discharge at will is the
entitlement.
Posner's argument that discharge at will embodies efficiency falls
to pieces if discharge at will prevails as a bargaining outcome only
because it first prevails as the initial entitlement. Empirical evidence
supports this notion. European workers enjoying legal protection
for job security do not generally work under discharge at will contracts.2 1 5 Thus, bargaining outcomes seem strongly dependent on
the initial assignment of entitlement. If so, Posner's efficiency analysis sinks into indeterminacy and uselessness. His method serves
only to defend the haves in what they have and to justify giving them
more.
The third argument in Posner's repertoire states that employers
extending job security to workers will tend to pay lower wages than
comparable employers who retain power to discharge at will.216
This point may be true, but it is also irrelevant. Posner presumably
means to suggest that workers are better off under the discharge at
will rule than under ajob security rule becausejob security comes at
the cost of lost wages. While it is true that workers under job security contracts may earn less than those under discharge at will contracts,
job security workers and discharge at will workers are both better off
under a job security entitlement than their respective counterparts
under the discharge at will entitlement. Under either initial configuration, workers who wind up in discharge at will contracts may earn
higher wages than those who wind up in job security contracts. The
difference lies in the way they arrive there. Under the discharge at
will rule, workers who want job security must buy it, leaving them
worse off than they would be ifjob security were theirs to start with.
Workers under a job security entitlement, however, who are willing
to risk discharge at will, can trade their security away for a wage
premium, making them better off than workers under a discharge at
will rule who have no entitlement to trade away. Posner misconstrues a truism about contracts for a truth about efficiency. The fact
that job security workers may earn less than those with discharge at
215. See Raday, Individual and Collctive Dismissal-AJob Security Dichotomy, 10 COMP. LAB. L.
121, 121 (1989) (recognizing distinction between European job security model and American
employment at will labor tradition); Comment, Employment-At-Will: The French Experience As a
Basisfor Reform, 9 COMP. LAB. L. 294, 316-18 (1988) (discussing trend among industrialized
democracies, other than United States, to enact unjust dismissal legislation).
216. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 13, at 307.
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will contracts, which is true regardless of the legal rule, does not
mean that they are better off without a right to job security.
CONCLUSION

Posner is widely reported to be brilliant and creative and has been
described by prominent observers, even those who disagree with
him, as a "genius." 2 17 I do not dispute these abstract characterizations. Posner's scholarship, however, does little to support his superb intellectual reputation. Although Posner has invested his
scholarly career in the endeavor known as law and economics, careful appraisal reveals that his thought is held together by a remarkable array of alarming values, unexamined and implausible
assumptions, circular arguments, and logical fallacies. By comparing Posner's reputation with his actual scholarly record, I do not
seek to villif/ Posner ad hominem. Rather, my objective is to provoke
reflection and discussion on the relationships among scholarship,
reputation, and ideology. Posner himself might even welcome such
indicates a strong
a dialogue. In fact, his book on Justice Cardozo
2 18
interest in issues of legal scholarly reputation.
My deep dismay over Posner's strong intellectual reputation
should come as no surprise. Posner is a man for his time, not unlike
Cardozo in Posner's assessment of him. During the past two decades American capitalism has grown increasingly destructive and
inept, while the intellectual energy devoted to defending it has
mounted exponentially. This intellectual effort has confronted special difficulties in legal scholarship, due to the debunking legacy of
legal realism, the critical school that flowered earlier in our century,
during a previous period of capitalist crisis. Legal realism unmasked the ideological sleights of hand which allowed an inequitable regime of property and market rules to proclaim itself as natural,
inevitable, brilliantly created, and good. Legal realism's central insights are so elegant and simple that they are virtually undeniable by
anyone who understands them, and a sophisticated thinker like Posner cannot escape acknowledging their power at the level of technical analysis. Early law and economics, such as the Coase
Theorem 2 19 and some of Calabresi's early work, 2 20 extended and
217. See Warren, Richard Posner Shakes Up the Bench, AMERICAN LAWYER, Sept. 1983, at 7576 (citing unconfirmed report that former Justice William Brennan considers Posner
"genius").
218.

See generally R. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990).

219. See generally Coase, supra note 133.
220. See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
LJ.499 (1961); Calabresi, The Decisionfor Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78
HARV. L. REv. 713 (1965).
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applied the modernist attitude of legal realism in a way disquieting
to some long-accepted liberal pieties. 22 1 The ironic aftermath, however, is that Coase has been more fully assimilated by left-liberal
commentators than by those operating from a business and conservative standpoint. At the same time, law and economics has repeatedly ignored the main insights of legal realism, while casting
itself as congruent and continuous with them. These trends are exemplified in Posner's work, which is often obtuse to the realist insight that legal rulings, social power dynamics, and patterns of
economic distribution condition each other mutually, and to the
Coasean insight that none of these factors bear any relationship to
"efficiency," except perhaps through the murky prism of transaction
costs.
Despite these fundamental shortcomings, Posner's work has acquired a monumental reputation. The long-term significance of
Posner's work, however, may be quite different than Posner's current intellectual reputation. By pushing neoclassical efficiency logic
into all areas of the law, Posner's work hastens recognition of the
absurdities and paradoxes which have always lurked within neoclassical analysis. We now live in a moment when the prevailing private
economic order is confronting both its intellectual defenselessness,
long since established by legal realism and other critical schools,
and a deepening crisis in performance, both of which heighten the
need for work like Posner's. What could be more natural in such a
period than the high reputation of a champion of the decaying order
who writes within an elaborate veneer of neutrality and novelty?
The spasmodic twitchings within Posner's thought echo the desperate thrashings of an economic order struggling to escape the destructive self-contradictions that define its identity and give it its
very life.

221. See Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 906-11
(1980) (tracing early law and economics in law schools).

